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This paper is motivated by the overall trend of decreasing youth voter turnout since the 1960s in the U.S,
which has been accompanied by large fluctuations in turnout between election cycles. By contrast, older
age groups vote at higher rates with less variation in turnout between elections over time. This paper
aims to identify some independent variables that affect youth voter turnout rate and its’ fluctuation over
time. Using American National Election Survey data, a correlation is observed between certain candidate
character traits and youth voter turnout. This study focuses on a candidate’s morality and intelligence by
studying these traits’ independent effect on youth voter turnout over time. By conducting two online
experiments with 295 participants aged 18-24, this study found that subjects who received a cue about a
candidate’s morality were more likely to vote and participate in an election than if they did not receive that
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and participate as opposed to receiving no cue. The unintelligent cue had no intended treatment effect.
Furthermore, the study found that the observed increase in a commitment to participate for both studies
was stronger for low cost forms of participation, such as voting than high cost forms of participation,
such as canvassing. Finally, among 18-24 year olds, race and age act as moderating variables on the
effect that candidate morality has on voting behavior. Age, but not race, acts as a moderating variable on
the effect that candidate intelligence has on voting behavior. This study contributes to the field by
identifying variables that might be predictive of youths’ voting behavior in future elections. Additionally,
this study adds to the body of motivating factors for voter turnout theory more broadly.
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Abstract
This paper is motivated by the overall trend of decreasing youth voter turnout since the
1960s in the U.S, which has been accompanied by large fluctuations in turnout between election
cycles. By contrast, older age groups vote at higher rates with less variation in turnout between
elections over time. This paper aims to identify some independent variables that affect youth
voter turnout rate and its’ fluctuation over time. Using American National Election Survey data,
a correlation is observed between certain candidate character traits and youth voter turnout.
This study focuses on a candidate’s morality and intelligence by studying these traits’
independent effect on youth voter turnout over time. By conducting two online experiments with
295 participants aged 18-24, this study found that subjects who received a cue about a
candidate’s morality were more likely to vote and participate in an election than if they did not
receive that cue. Among 18-24 year olds, a perceived positive intelligence cue resulted in a
higher commitment to vote and participate as opposed to receiving no cue. The unintelligent cue
had no intended treatment effect. Furthermore, the study found that the observed increase in a
commitment to participate for both studies was stronger for low cost forms of participation, such
as voting than high cost forms of participation, such as canvassing. Finally, among 18-24 year
olds, race and age act as moderating variables on the effect that candidate morality has on
voting behavior. Age, but not race, acts as a moderating variable on the effect that candidate
intelligence has on voting behavior. This study contributes to the field by identifying variables
that might be predictive of youths’ voting behavior in future elections. Additionally, this study
adds to the body of motivating factors for voter turnout theory more broadly.
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Introduction
This paper begins with an overview of the history of youth voter laws and youth voting
turnout trends at the national level. Youth voter turnout has decreased over time and fluctuated
from election to election within this broader trend. The Introduction uses these empirical data as
the starting point for the research question: What factor(s) could be motivating young individuals
to turnout in one election cycle but not in the subsequent election? The answer to this question
necessarily lies in a variable that can change from one election to the next. After an analysis of
cumulative data file from the American National Election Survey (2010), this paper identifies
perceived cues about a candidate’s morality and intelligence as potential factors affecting youth
turnout. Finally, this section discusses the results of two experiments, “Experiment 1: Morality”
and “Experiment 2: Intelligence,” and how these variables affect youth political participation.
1971 marked a particularly interesting landmark for American politics—particularly for
the spirit of an inclusive democracy. Congress passed an amendment to the Constitution
lowering the voting age from 21 to 18 in an effort to ignite the political hearts of young people.
Indeed, one major intention of this amendment was capturing youth interest in politics before it
was too late. Largely, this effort reflected an early observation among the political elite that
young people were not voting at the same rates as their older counterparts. This observation
turned out to be an ongoing trend in American politics. Hopeful at the time, however, many
elites believed this was simply because young people hadn’t been offered a chance to engage
politically early enough in their lives (Wattenberg 2006).
The 26th Amendment, however, did not have the intended effect of increasing
youth voter turnout. The 1972 presidential elections resulted in a dismally low voter turnout rate
among newly enfranchised 18-20 year olds compared to any other age group, with only 48%
turning up to the polls (Wattenberg 2006). Since 1972, there has been ongoing debate about why
5

young people systematically vote at lower rates than their older counterparts. Markedly, there
has been little speculation about why this gap has widened steadily and fluctuated dramatically
(A. Martin 2012; U.S Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, select years). Indeed, there is
much more variation in turnout among 18-24 year olds from election to election than any other
age group. For those aged 65 and up, the percent of the electorate that turns out is constant and
predictable (with a standard deviation of 4.8% across 18 election cycle values). By contrast, 1824 year olds have steadily voted less over time with greater variation of turnout from election to
election (with a standard deviation of 10.8 across 18 election cycle values) (Pomante and
Schraufnagel 2014, 2). This suggests some variable is affecting youths but not affecting older
cohorts’ voting behavior. This study identified “perceived candidate morality” and “perceived
candidate intelligence” as correlative variables with voter turnout among youths using ANES
cumulative data. The ANES data, however, cannot draw a causal link between the independent
variables (candidate traits) and the dependent variables (youth political participation). To test the
causal relationship of candidate traits on youth turnout, two experiments, involving 295 subjects
aged 18-24, were conducted. Subjects were treated with candidate flyers for fictitious
gubernatorial elections to test the effect of candidate morality (experiment 1) and candidate
intelligence (experiment 2) on voting behavior.
“Experiment 1: Morality” found that when youths are cued with either highly moral or
immoral candidate flyers, they are more likely to commit to voting than when no cue is given.
“Experiment 2: Intelligence” resulted in a higher rate of political participation when a candidate
appeared highly intelligent than when a candidate appeared unintelligent or when no intelligence
cue was given. Finally, both experiments found a positive correlation between taking pride in a
candidate and candidate morality and intelligence. Because “taking pride in a candidate” is
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difficult to operationalize using candidate flyers in an experimental setting, future study is
needed to test the causal relationship between taking pride in a candidate and youth voter
turnout.
First, it is important to clarify why it matters if young people vote, since they comprise
only a small portion of the eligible voting population.
Why Youth Turnout Matters
One argument is that while voting is not the only way to be civically engaged, it
serves as an appropriate proxy, or thermometer, for other civic behavior. Given that voting
serves as a proxy, it is troubling if young citizens don’t vote in part because this translates to a
lack of civic engagement across other areas like community leadership or volunteer efforts. The
second reason voting matters is because it is “the defining feature of the democratic process,”
(Dalton 2005, 4) and the best equalizer of citizens into political entities (Verba et al., 12). The
health of the political system relies on a certain faith and participation within that system.
Finally, the fewer people, and thus interests, expressed through voting enables narrow interest
groups to capture the political front (Teixera 1987, 4).
The third reason why it’s important to study voter behavior among young people lies in
practical application. Teasing out the predictors of low participation lends itself to a potential
prescription in the face of a political paradox. This Paradox of Participation (Brody 1978) states
that despite fewer barriers, higher education, and more readily available information, young
people are continuously voting less since the 1980s (Teixera 1987, 3). This paradox presents a
motivating question for political scientists: “Have we misidentified the factors that influence
voting patterns among youths?” If this is the case, there are two possibilities as to why this has
happened. The first possibility is that what brings young people to the polls is different than for
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older voters, and has not been identified since the ratification of the 26th Amendment.
Alternatively, the inability to account for youth voter turnout fluctuation (and it’s recent decline)
may be the result of a new variable affecting youth turnout in the face of a changing social and
political landscape. For example, relatively new trends among youths, such as a decrease in
conventional community engagement and an increase in community service, have emerged since
the 1970s that did not exist historically (Syvertsen et al. 2011).
Due to the cross-sectional nature of this study, only the first possibility can be explored.
If the motivating behavior to vote among youths is a recent change, future research will need to
address this through longitudinal and historical study. In this study, a consideration of why
youths are unaccounted for among existing theories is addressed without undertaking the issue of
changing motivations across time. Existing theories, presented below under Existing Voter
Turnout Theories, successfully predict voting rates across a host of variables for older
generations through time. However, these theories do not explain the slight trending decline in
youth turnout in recent presidential elections or the wide variation in turnout from one
presidential election to the next.
Existing Voter Turnout Theories
This section introduces the existing theories for voter turnout behavior and their
explanatory power for the current trends in turnout among youths. The main theories presented
in this section can be grouped into cost-benefit analysis theories, behavioral voting theories, and
cohort theories. Each overarching theoretical framework, and each theory within that framework,
accounts for some piece of the puzzle that motivates voting behavior among youths. Some
theories are interrelated, and some are at odds with one another. This section compares the
existing theories in the literature and notes a fundamental gap across the board. None of the
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theories can account for the fluctuation from election to election in youth voter turnout or
declining turnout in youth voting patterns over time.
Indeed, the problem with these theories is that each fail to explain one of two phenomena,
or both. The first gap in the literature is that as a general trend young people are voting less and
less with each decade since the 1980’s than their previous counterparts. The second issue at hand
is that these theories cannot account for what Aaron Martin (2012) has identified as “volatile
voting behavior.” The American National Election Survey (ANES), a comprehensive
presidential and midterm election survey conducted since 1952, reveals a widening gap in the
overall turnout rate between cohorts, which is punctuated by distinctive spikes and dips. Young
people turned out in droves for Kennedy in 1960, Clinton in 1992, and again in 2008 for Obama,
with smaller fluctuations throughout the period (A. Martin 2012, Plutzer 2002). Noteworthy is
the subsequent decline in turnout for Clinton in 1996 and for Obama in 2012 among the same
age group, suggesting “Clinton” and “Obama” are not in themselves explanatory variables. The
overwhelming trend has been a widening gap between middle aged and young voters since the
1980s, from about 11 percentage points to a high of 27 points in 1988.
Voter Turnout Between Cohorts Over Time
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Cost-Benefit Analysis Theories
The factors that influence whether or not an individual votes in a particular election are
sometimes understood in terms of a cost-benefit analysis: people must weigh the costs of
registering and voting against the benefits of participation. The costs are always non-zero. They
include travel time to the polls, registration, and political education. Furthermore, the benefits
often appear very close to zero as people consider the likelihood that their vote bears weight on
the election outcome. However, benefits can include an array of less tangible things, termed
“expressive benefits,” which include fulfilling a duty towards a party or candidate or voting for a
cause (Teixera 1987). While cost-benefit analyses may explain why any given person may or
may not vote, and may identify environmental or situational factors that contribute to the costs or
benefits of voting, they cannot account for the relevant behavioral factors affecting voting.
Behavioral factors include habituation to voting or peer pressure (Campbell 2006). These
behavioral factors are discussed in the next subsection.
Another type of cost-benefit analysis framework in the literature focuses on resource
availability (Plutzer 2002, 41). Resources can function as an elimination to barriers that might
otherwise be considered costs. Instead, researchers have found that resources—including
education, socioeconomic status, and political knowledge—is associated with higher levels of
turnout (Plutzer 2002, 41). However, neither Teixera’s cost-benefit analysis nor Plutzer’s
resource framework have been integrated into a holistic approach that captures longitudinal
changes in voter turnout, or fluctuation among different age groups of the population (Plutzer
2002; Wolfinger 2007).
A third type of cost-benefit analysis is introduced by Wattenberg (2006), which focuses
on the availability of information and its ability to inform the voter of the benefits of voting. In
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other words, the more information a voter has on an issue, the more likely he or she will find it
beneficial to vote on the issue. Wattenberg goes on to introduce a paradox: he notes that despite
increasing access to information, young people are less likely to become informed. Lower rates
of T.V watching, newspaper reading, and knowledge of public affairs result in young people not
caring who wins; people vote when they care who wins (Wattenberg 2006). This theory may be
able to explain the spike in 2008 when candidates or issues successfully captivated the interests
of youths through the media. However, it still doesn’t successfully account for why young people
were captivated by these issues in the first place.
A fourth theory under the umbrella of cost-benefit analysis moves beyond discussion on
resource constraints to incorporate emotionality in voting theory. While this theory relies on
behavioral drives (emotions) that influence voting behavior, Marcus and Mackuen situate their
theory in the broader cost-benefit analysis (Marcus and Mackuen 1993). They find that perceived
candidate traits can be understood as an emotional response to information in an election cycle.
These scholars found that voter anxiety and enthusiasm vary with both elections and political
events, and do not remain static within an individual (Marcus and Mackuen 1993, 672). In
summation, emotions are short term and therefore may generate political attentiveness in one
election and not in another. Most importantly for the study done and discussed in this paper,
Marcus and Mackuen found that political leaders can generate these emotions in voters.
Behavioral Voting Theories
Theories that take components of the human behavior into account often draw a causal
link between peer pressure, persistence (long-term habituation), inertia (short-term habituation),
or social attitudes with an increased likelihood of voting. This varies from a cost-benefit analysis
in that a voter may be unaware of the psychological or behavioral factors driving him or her to
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vote, such as habituation. One theory that takes into account the behavior behind voting was
introduced by Joseph Nye, and could give rise to a general lack of voting among 18-25 year olds.
Here, I have termed it Disaffected Youth Theory. Nye notes that in 1964, three quarters of
Americans “trusted the government to do the right thing most of the time,” and this had declined
to a mere quarter of respondents by 1997 (Nye 1997, 1). Similarly, confidence in institutions,
such as churches and companies had declined from the 1960s to the 1990s. While a healthy dose
of skepticism has always existed in American politics, a lack of trust could explain changing
incentives to vote in the overarching cost-benefit analysis. However, Nye’s Disaffected Youth
Theory does not explain the wide fluctuation in youth turnout across elections. If trust in
government has steadily declined from the 1960s to 1990s, the spikes in turnout among youths
remains unexplained.
Another theory, introduced by Wolfinger and Rosenstone, could be viewed as a hybrid
between a cost-benefit analysis voting theory and a behavioral voting theory. It is grouped with
the latter, however, due to its reliance on a psychological habituation to voting. Wolfinger and
Rosenstone (2007) built on the existing scholarship that correlates higher educational attainment
(resource availability theory) with increased voter turnout. They argue that life experience can
eventually substitute a formal education in predicting voting patterns. Plutzer has confirmed this
finding, noting that “life experience” mediates at least a third of the effect that higher education
has on voting (Plutzer 2002, 42). Indeed, the voter turnout gap between those with and without a
college degree closes significantly with age (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 2007, 60). Milbrath
(1965) suggests this illustrates a psychological habituation to voting that deepens with
reinforcement. This theory explains why young people vote at lower rates than their
counterparts, but cannot explain turnout fluctuation over time.
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A third theory that relies heavily on behavioral phenomena to explain voting behavior is
Plutzer’s Developmental Theory. This is the most comprehensive longitudinal theory that
accounts for voter turnout steadily increasing with age, yet eventually leveling off. Much like
Nye’s theory, Plutzer relies on some cost-benefit and resource availability theories to inform his
own. Plutzer argues that while initial resources, costs, and political environmental affect one’s
likelihood of voting for the first time when they become eligible, there is also an effect of inertia.
As the costs of voting decrease, the resources increase. Thus, participation in elections increases.
Indeed, Plutzer accounts for the consistent voter turnout among older cohorts by discussing these
phenomena through a behavioral lens of inertia. He writes that the habituation to voting is not
exactly persistence, but instead dependent on more recent voting patterns. In other words, once
an individual is on the “voting bandwagon,” he or she isn’t likely to get off.
This is supported by the fact that in a self-reporting NES panel study, only 3% of people
who voted in 1968 and 1972 did not vote subsequently in either 1974 and 1976 (Plutzer 2002,
43). Plutzer’s theory does the most comprehensive job of explaining why fluctuations between
elections do not affect older generations. However, start-up costs do not differ dramatically or
homogenously from one election cycle to the next. Thus, we are left with youth voter
fluctuations largely unaccounted for. Clearly, the existing literature is rich with developed
theories that anticipate the factors that might make an individual, including young person, vote in
each election. However, none have successfully accounted for the spikes and dips in turnout
from one election to the next, which define 18 to 24 year olds’ voting patterns.
A fourth theory considers the distinct properties of a generation on voting behavior. This
theory provides a socialization explanation for each generation’s voting behavior. In other words,
the distinctive property of each cohort is not the age of that cohort, but the socialization climate
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in which those individuals were raised. The Generational Effect posits that political socialization
creates lasting effects that mediate current political landscapes (Miller 1992). Ultimately, this
second theory accounts for ‘persistence’—meaning that the long-term individual tendency to be
a voter, or nonvoter, is mediated by events in one’s formative years. Persistence and inertia are
similar behavioral tendencies, and thus The Generational Effect is also informed by a behavioral
theoretical lens. The Generational Effect also has the benefit of explaining steady voter decline
since 1980 in the face of technological ease and the steady erosion of barriers to voting (U.S
Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Select Years). Based on The Generational Effect, we
would expect non-voters to remain non-voters later in life as it is a product of their socialization,
and this has been the case. The current population survey shows a slight decline in turnout in
every age group over since the 1980s. Cost-benefit analysis theories cannot explain this decline
in turnout among all voters; on a cost-benefit or resource theory, the erosion of barriers should
result in increased voter turnout over time as barriers are reduced.
Reduction in barriers to voting incorporates cost-benefit analysis theories, further
nuancing this behavioral theory. This cost-benefit component of The Generational Effect adds an
explanatory edge over cohort theories in that the former accounts for the young people who do
vote: they are formally educated and able to grasp theoretical and abstract ideas (Wolfinger and
Rosenstone 2007, 60). Universities themselves provide extra-curriculum and communities for
civic engagement, which might otherwise not be had. Again, this theory cannot fully account for
decreased voter turnout or fluctuating rates, as the rates of college attendance have gone up since
1980. However, Plutzer (2002) notes that homogenous and largely non-voting environments, like
colleges, may encourage young people to think that voting is not important.
A fifth theory that falls under the behavioral theory umbrella in the literature utilizes
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Social Identity Theory to explain voting behavior. Recently, Pomante and Schraufnagel (2014)
have suggested that the widening gap between youths and older cohorts in turnout may be
attributed to Social Identity Theory, which hypothesizes that in an absence of developed stances
on political issues, young people vote for candidates who are like them: namely youthful. Their
study used photographs of political candidates, which measured a commitment to vote in an
election, but did not measure a voter’s choice for any particular candidate. They found that
Social Identity Theory is attributable to young voters’ voting behavior. Sigelman and Sigelman
(1982) found similar results using written descriptions of fictional candidates.
While these experiments are an important component in identifying the causal factors of
youth participation, they do not fully capture youths’ voting behavior. For example, in the 2016
primaries Senator Sanders earned 2,052,082 total votes from 18-24 year olds while Mr. Trump
and Secretary Clinton collectively received only 1,595,100 votes in that cohort (CIRCLE, Tufts
College of Civic Life 2016, 3). The experiment conducted here uses a similar experimental
design to Sigelman and Sigelman’s (1982) by creating fictional candidate profiles. However, this
design incorporates emotional voting behavior theories and high correlations observed in the
ANES data to evaluate the effects of perceived morality and intelligence on young people’s
voting patterns.
Theories that depend largely on human behavioral phenomena also tend to incorporate
cost-benefit analyses or cohort theories. Ultimately, these theories are dependent upon the
context in which human behavioral phenomena develop.
Cohort Theories
Cohort theories are informed by the differences between cohorts (age groups or
generations) to account for voting behavior. The dominant cohort theory in the literature is The
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Lifecycle Effect. The Lifecycle Effect attributes low voter turnout among youths to the typical
circumstances present in American life during one’s younger years (A. Martin 2012, 21; Pacheco
2008, 415). This theory posits that young people don’t vote simply in virtue of their
youthfulness. As the responsibilities of adulthood and stability come into focus, there is an
increased incentive to vote (A. Martin 2012, 21). The Lifecycle Effect has the advantage of
successfully predicting that as generations age, regardless of socialization climate, their voter
turnout increases.
Clearly, grouping existing voter turnout theories into three categories cost-benefit
theories, behavioral voting theories, and cohort theories does not result in three uniformly
distinct groups. The literary landscape is messy, and each type of theory incorporates some
information from another type. However, categorizing theories this way is useful for comparing
the existing theories. This study is intended to address the gap in the literature that cannot predict
the volatility in youth turnout from election to election. None of the theories can account for the
fluctuation over time in youth voter turnout and declining turnout. The gaps in the literature
around volatile voting behavior among youths and lower turnout in recent decades is the focus of
this experiment.
Candidate Traits and Youth Voter Turnout
This section focuses on establishing the correlation between candidate traits and youth
voter turnout in a national election. Establishing this correlation is the first step in identifying a
variable set that might affect younger voters’ political participation. This section first reiterates
why candidate traits are worth studying and then goes on to discuss the correlation between
candidate traits and youth turnout as observed by the American National Election Survey.
Finally, this section discusses the strengths and limitations of this source, and the need for an
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experimental setting to identify if there is a causal relationship between candidate traits and
youth turnout.
In order to build a comprehensive picture of the causal factors that might account for
both a general trend in decreased voting and account for substantial fluctuation among young
people, it is necessary to develop a hypothesis that is election cycle, and thus, candidate
dependent. Indeed, if U.S population demographics, such as educational attainment and political
knowledge are relatively steady across election cycles, then I hypothesize that the perception of
the candidates themselves are affecting first time voting rates. It is worth noting that this
explanatory variable reflects perceived and dynamic character traits and not policy proposals or
fixed candidate identity. Fixed traits such as race and sex cannot account for why candidates face
a disaffected youth upon reelection, unless the electorate has changed its perception of those
traits. For example, race is a fixed trait but the electorate has changed it perception of black
candidates over time.
Based on data provided by the American National Election Survey cumulative data file
(1964-2012), perceived presidential candidate traits including perceived pride in a candidate,
candidate knowledgeability, and candidate morality are correlated positively with higher rates of
voter turnout. This data set is a cross-sectional, equal probability sample that asks questions of
the electorate before and after national elections. It aims to analyze change over time in political
behavior, and is thus useful in tracking candidate perception over time (ANES 2010,
www.electionsurvey.org).
The ANES Cumulative Time series (1948-2012) is a comprehensive face-to-face selfadministered election survey that aggregates questions that have been asked in at least three
presidential election cycles into a single file available to the public. The sample size varies from
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election year to election year, usually falling between 1,000-3,000 respondents; the smallest
sample size was 662 respondents, in 1948, and the largest was 5,914, in 2012. The ANES is
conducted across the 48 continental states in English or Spanish. Respondents who did not
complete both a pre- and post-election survey in any given cycle were treated as missing values.
While the exact wording of the questions has changed across elections, this is only to reflect the
political context of the day (ANES 2010 electionsurvey.org).
Using STATA (2014) programming, a comparison of respondents’ answers was done for
different questions across time, and controlling for certain demographics—including age.
Through by-sorting perceived candidate traits by age across time, correlations appear between
youth voter turnout and young people’s perceptions of candidates among a few specific
candidate traits. Question thermometers in multiple presidential election cycles gauge feelings on
a scale of 1-4 for perceived qualities of the Democratic and Republican candidates such as
knowledge, decency, compassion, inspiration, and morality. A 1 is coded as the response for a
candidate “extremely” exhibiting the trait, 2 represents the variable value for exhibiting the
quality “quite well,” while 3 is “not too well” and 4 is “not well at all.” Other answers including
“don’t know” and “missing” are treated as missing values.
Although the general decline in voter turnout began in the 1970s, this study incorporates
7 ANES turnout results beginning with Reagan’s election in 1980 and ending with Obama’s in
2008 because questions about candidate traits were not asked in the ANES pre-election survey
before 1980. The 2008 election has a significant amount of data coded as missing because nearly
half of respondents did not complete the first wave of the panel study. Thus, for some candidate
traits the 2008 data is not used to draw correlations with youth voter turnout because of the much
smaller sample size.
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Many of the candidate traits show weak or spurious relationships with youth turnout. For
example, perceptions of a candidate as inspiring, compassionate, or decent does not vary with
high or low turnout among youths. However, perceived candidate morality, intelligence and
pride in candidate are all correlated with voter turnout across election cycles among 18-24 year
olds, particularly for the Republican candidates. The correlation between turnout and taking
pride in a candidate is presented below. For, Democrats the correlation between pride and
turnout holds up across three of the seven election cycles studied. For Republicans, the
correlation between pride and youth voter turnout is observed for six of the seven elections
studied. The bolded rows highlight where a positive correlation held up between turnout and the
candidate trait for the two major parties.
The question “Candidate affects—Proud” is a binary variable that measures whether a
respondent takes pride in the candidate in the pre-election survey. A 1 is coded as “Yes I have
felt pride in the candidate” and a 2 is coded as “No, I have not felt pride in the candidate.” This
trait showed the strongest correlation across the seven election cycles studied. Since pride
resulted in the strongest correlation, the study done for this paper will focus on identifying a
correlation between pride and morality and intelligence. If this correlation holds in my
experiment, which does not directly test a causal relationship between pride and turnout, this
provides an opportunity for future research. Indeed, if pride covaries with cues about morality
and intelligence, which in turn are predictive of youth turnout, then pride may be a third
predictive variable of youth turnout. Below, the relationship between pride and turnout for
Democratic and Republican is presented candidates through the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s.
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Democratic Presidential Candidates: Correlating Pride and Turnout
Year

Youth Turnout

Percent of youths who have felt Pride in the Candidate

1980

40%

44.83%

1984

41%

29.55%

1988

36% (-)

22.77% (-)

1992

42% (+)

25.79% (+)

1996

32%

55.56%

2000

32%

32.88%

2004

41%

30.71%

2008

44% (+)

58.37% (+)

Republican Presidential Candidates: Correlating Pride and Turnout
Year

Youth Turnout

Percent of youths who have felt Pride in the Candidate

1980

40%

23.28%

1984

41% (+)

52.94% (+)

1988

36% (-)

33.17% (-)

1992

42% (+)

54.30% (+)

1996

32% (-)

22.22% (-)

2000

32% (=)

22.60% (=)

2004

41% (+)

55.12% (+)

2008

44%

23.08%

The correlations between candidate traits and youth turnout are presented in the table
below. For morality, a correlation between high levels of morality and youth turnout is shown.
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For knowledgeability, a correlation between low levels of knowledgeability and youth turnout is
shown. Again, the correlation holds strongest for Republican candidates. The four tables suggest
that when youths are given a strong cue about candidate morality or intelligence, they are more
likely to vote. The strength of the relationship varies dramatically, and is at times spurious,
which necessitates an experimental study to evaluate a potential causal relationship between the
variables. For democrats, the correlation held up across three of six elections. For Republicans,
the correlation held up for five of the six elections studied.
Democratic Presidential Candidates: Correlating Morality and Turnout
Year

Youth Turnout

Percent of youths who saw candidate as “Extremely” Moral

1980

40%

18.53%

1984

41%

15.12%

1988

36% (-)

3.47% (-)

1992

42% (+)

6.79% (+)

1996

32% (-)

3.34% (-)

2000

32%

19.86%

2004

41%

11.02%

2008

44%

N/A (49.77% of respondents coded as missing)
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Republican Presidential Candidates: Correlating Morality and Turnout
Year

Youth Turnout

Percent of youths who saw candidate as “Extremely” Moral

1980

40%

9.91%

1984

41% (+)

22.34% (+)

1988

36% (-)

16.83% (-)

1992

42% (+)

19.91% (+)

1996

32% (-)

13.86% (-)

2000

32%

11.64%

2004

41% (+)

16.54% (+)

2008

44%

N/A (49.77% of respondents coded as missing)

The correlations between perceiving a candidate as highly moral varies with turnout
when looking at both Republicans and Democrats across time, particularly with Republicans.
The only year for which this relationship is not observed for either candidate is in 2000, when
voter turnout remained the same from the previous election—and the Republican candidate was
perceived as less moral than the previous candidate and the Democratic candidate was perceived
as more moral than the candidate. Thus, I hypothesize that candidate morality is affecting youth
voter turnout.
Since perceived candidate morality and voter turnout are correlated (particularly for
Republican candidates) it is important to consider if looking at negative candidate traits produces
the same correlation. This may illustrate protest voting. The correlations for “not at all
knowledgeable” and youth voter turnout are only observed in two consecutive election cycles
among Democratic candidates and with little strength. However, perceived unintelligence and
youth turnout vary together across at least four of the election cycles for Republican nominees.
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This might be due to young liberal idealists voting against conservative candidates who they find
unknowledgeable. The study conducted for this paper will explore the possibility for protest
voting by looking at both high and low levels of candidate morality and its effect on turnout; the
experiment will also study the effect of both high and low levels of intelligence on youth voter
turnout.
In the ANES data, perceived candidate lack of knowledge is weakly correlated with
increased youth voter turnout; two of six presidential elections among Democratic candidates
resulted in a correlation with youth turnout and candidate unintelligence. For Republicans, the
correlation held up across four of the six elections studied. However, perceived intelligence in a
candidate is hypothesized to be positively correlated with feelings of pride. In this study,
intelligence is used to operationalize perceived candidate knowledgeability. In the section
Morality, Intelligence and Pride, the positive correlation between high morality, high
intelligence, increased feelings of pride, and increased voter turnout is discussed.
Democratic Presidential Candidates: Correlating Low Knowledgeability and Turnout
Year

Youth Turnout

Percent of youths who saw candidate as “Not at all” Knowledgeable

1980

40%

3.83%

1984

41%

1.72%

1988

36% (-)

3.47% (-)

1992

42% (+)

3.62% (+)

1996

32%

5.13%

2000

32%

2.74%

2004

41%

2.36%

2008

44%

N/A (49.77% of respondents coded as missing)
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Republican Presidential Candidates: Correlating Unintelligence and Turnout
Year

Youth Turnout

Percent of youths who saw candidate as “Not at all” Knowledgeable

1980

40%

7.33%

1984

41%

6.53%

1988

36% (-)

2.48% (-)

1992

42% (+)

2.71% (+)

1996

32% (-)

0.85% (-)

2000

32%

6.85%

2004

41% (+)

19.96% (+)

2008

44%

N/A

Since this study relies largely on the ANES Cumulative Data file, it is important to
acknowledge its strengths and weaknesses. The longitudinal and national nature of the ANES
data makes it particularly valuable for identifying persistent factors that affect youth voter
turnout by fortifying its external validity. External validity is the extent to which data accurately
reflect the real world. Another related strength of the ANES data is the cross sectional equal
probabilistic nature of the sample, which ensures that no segment of the population is
underrepresented.
The ANES cumulative data file also has weaknesses, however. Due to the extensive list
of variables that could be affecting survey answers in a national survey on presidential elections,
it is difficult to isolate the intended variable. The benefit of conducting a controlled experiment
lies in the ability to isolate the intended variable for precision, resulting in higher internal
validity. Internal validity is the extent to which the results of an experiment reflect the changes of
the intended independent variable studied. While an experiment with a much smaller sample size
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will not provide the same external validity as the ANES cumulative data, this study seeks to test
a causal account of the observed correlations in the ANES data.
Hypotheses
Having identified these two candidate traits as variable trends in youth turnout over time
in the ANES data, this study seeks to reproduce these correlations in a two-part experiment. The
Hypotheses section raises five hypotheses tested in the experiment that are supported by the
ANES cumulative data and existing voter turnout theories.
Hypothesis 1: Among 18-24 year olds, elections with a candidate who is perceived as
highly moral or immoral will produce a stronger commitment to vote and participate than in an
election without such a candidate. Importantly, this hypothesis predicts that any cue about
morality—positive or negative—will increase voter turnout. This hypothesis is supported by the
correlation between youth voter turnout and the morality of real candidates in the ANES data
file.
The second hypothesis pertains to the second trait studied in this experiment, intelligence.
Hypothesis 2: Among 18-24 year olds, elections with a candidate who is perceived as intelligent
or unintelligent will produce a stronger commitment to vote and participate than in an election
without such a candidate. This study uses “perceived intelligence” instead of “perceived
knowledgeability.” The Mariam Webster Dictionary defines knowledgeability as “having or
showing knowledge or intelligence.” Thus, this study functions under the assumption that
intelligence and knowledge convey the same trait. Furthermore, an intelligence cue is easier to
operationalize on a pamphlet than specific issue knowledgeability. Therefore, measuring
candidate intelligence provides a greater opportunity to evoke the intended treatment effect.
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The third hypotheses states that: Among 18-24 year olds, candidates who are perceived
as highly intelligent or highly moral are more likely to be a candidate to take pride in than
candidates who are not perceived as highly intelligent or moral. Since pride in a candidate is
most strongly correlated with youth voter turnout, but also difficult to capture as an independent
variable, intelligence and morality will serve as correlative variables. This experiment
hypothesizes that taking pride in a candidate will increase among 18 to 24 year olds when the
candidate is also perceived as highly moral or highly intelligent.
The fourth and fifth hypotheses address moderating variables examined in
the literature review of voter turnout theory. According to behavioral theories of voting, we
would anticipate that voter identity might moderate the effect of the independent variable
(character trait) on political participation. Hypothesis 4: Among 18-24 year olds, age will have a
moderating effect on the interaction between the candidate traits and self-reported political
participation. The fifth hypothesis anticipates that age, even within a single generation, can
moderate the effect of candidate traits on political participation. Hypothesis 5: Among 18-24 year
olds, race will have a moderating effect on the interaction between the candidate traits and selfreported political participation.
Experimental Design
In this section, the experiment designed to test the five hypotheses is presented in detail.
The experiment was designed specifically to test a causal relationship between some of the
correlations observed in the cumulative ANES data file as well as some of the theories in the
existing literature on youth turnout.
In order to test these five hypotheses, two separate experiments were designed using
fictitious election materials and survey software on Qualtrics.com (Appendix 1). The first
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experiment will refer to the experiment that tests the first, third, fourth, and fifth hypotheses. The
second experiment will refer to the experiment that tests the second, third, fourth, and fifth
hypotheses. In other words, the first experiment studied the effect of the candidate trait morality
(independent variable) by using fictitious election flyers on young individuals’ commitment to
participate in elections through voting, encouraging peers to vote, canvassing, and donating
money to a campaign (dependent variables). The second experiment studied the effect of the
candidate trait intelligence (independent variable), again, by using fictitious election flyers on
young individuals’ commitment to participate in elections through voting, encouraging peers to
vote, canvassing and donating money to a campaign (dependent variables). This notation is
merely nominal, as the order of experiments was randomized when assigned to subjects. This
randomization is intended to nullify any effect of conducting one experiment before the other.
Each respondent got one of three flyers (independent variable treatments) for each experiment.
The experiments studied the effect of moderating variables by asking respondents about their
demographical background.
The experiment was introduced to subjects with a consent form followed by a “Purpose
Statement,” written below:
In some research studies, the investigators cannot tell you exactly what the study is about
before you participate in the study. We will describe the tasks in the study in a general
way, but we can't explain the real purpose of the study until after you complete these
tasks. When you are done, we will explain why we are doing this study, what we are
looking at, and any other information you should know about this study.
At the end of the study, the respondents were offered this fuller explanation of the
purpose of the experiment:
Thank you for participating in this survey! Now that it is over, I am happy to tell you
what we are researching.
Each candidate flyer you looked at was intended to cue a specific personality trait in that
candidate. Either the candidate flyer was intended to evoke a relatively moral or immoral
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candidate, or an intelligent or unintelligent one. You may also have randomly been
assigned to the control group; these flyers didn't have any particular personality traits. I
am looking to see if, and how, young people respond differently to these two personality
traits when they think about voting in an election.
After the consent and purpose statement, subjects were prompted with these directions:
Directions: On the following slide, you will be shown a flyer about a candidate in an
upcoming gubernatorial election.
• Read the pamphlet carefully, as you will be asked a few questions pertaining to it on
the following page.
• Then, you will be shown another and asked questions about this second flyer as well. The
2 candidate flyers you will see are randomly assigned, unrelated, and should be
considered independently of one another. This study is conducted with the
understanding that some election cycles, and some candidates, produce significantly
different levels of engagement on the part of eligible voters.
Both experiments involved randomly treating subjects with one of three election flyers. In
the first experiment, a white man named “Representative Brian Walsh” was intended to cue
either a perception of a moral, immoral, or morally neutral (control) candidate through a flyer.
This was achieved by changing only one or two sentences about the candidate between the
flyers. In the second experiment, a white man named “Representative Michael Tipson” was
intended to cue either intelligence, unintelligence, or give no intelligence cue at all (control),
again, by slightly altering the wording on the flyers. All six flyers, three from each experiment,
encouraged subjects to vote for the candidate described. In both experiments, the fictitious
candidates were running for governor of an unnamed state in 2017 instead of running for
president, which the ANES cumulative data reflects. While this constrains the external validity
of the experiment, using Gubernatorial candidates provided a more realistic study in a postpresidential election year. Additionally, using fictitious gubernatorial candidates may draw fewer
resemblances to real candidates in high profile national elections. Below are the control flyers
(stimuli) for the morality and intelligence experiments.
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Morality Experiment, Control Flyer

Intelligence Experiment, Control Flyer

The control treatments, shown above, have no morality or intelligence cue. Each flyer
with a positive or negative character trait added a sentence or two to the control flyer along with
a quote from a supporter. The positive morality treatment for Representative Walsh included

29

“I’m a proud family man whose primary commitment is integrity, and I hope you’ll vote for me
on May 9th.” The positive morality treatment also included the quote: “‘His weekly volunteer
work with our local children’s shelter is always appreciated—he’s got a heart of gold!’ –Anne
D.” The negative morality cue was operationalized by adding “We’ve played by the rules long
enough, it’s time to get the results the people of this state deserve. I hope you’ll cast your ballot
for me on May 9th.” This flyer was accompanied by the quote: “‘Rep. Walsh knows loop holes
and tax breaks are best seen as opportunities for growth and success. He won’t let anything or
anyone get in his way!’ –Anne D.” Subjects received only one of these three flyers in the
morality experiment.
Each subject was also randomly assigned to one of the three flyers for candidate Michael
Tipson (intelligence experiment). The positive intelligence treatment was cued with the
following sentence in addition to the information on the control flyer: “My breadth of experience
ranging from foreign diplomacy to Special Advisor on statewide natural disasters gives me the
unique experience to help our Commonwealth succeed.” The quote on that pamphlet came from
a local supporter, Gary L., reading: “His nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize this past year
demonstrates the candor and dedication he brings to his work, and to our state.”
The language used on the negative intelligence pamphlet is a bit less obvious since a
realistic informational election flyer would portray a candidate in his or her best light. However,
this was operationalized by focusing on a lack of experience or expertise for governmental
matters—similar to a lack of “knowledgeability” used in the ANES question wording. The
unintelligent treatment portraying Michael Tipson, read: “I’ve lived in this state all my life—as
your neighbor. I believe this job can be well done by a local like me, even if I lack the experience
or expertise of the former Governor.” The supporting quote reads: “‘Mike coached our kids
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baseball team fulltime—he’s always taking on new projects, and this time, he wants to give back
to his home state!’ –Gary L.”
Before receiving one flyer from each experiment, subjects responded to some questions
about their political behavior and identity. They were prompted to report their age, race, and
formal educational attainment. Then, subjects were asked how much they cared about the
outcome of the 2016 U.S election and whether they had voted, registered, or did neither in the
2016 presidential election. The personal demographics were used to observe moderating
variables and test hypotheses four and five. The political engagement questions provided context
for the external validity of the experiment. It is important to note that the average self-reported
voting rates and voter interests among subjects was higher than the national, constraining the
external validity of the experiment. This may be because of social desirability bias or due to the
studies’ self-selecting nature.
After answering these questions, the subjects were shown one of three flyers, randomly
assigned, from one of the two experiments. After reading it, the subject responded to six
questions, each on a 7-point scale. These six questions are the dependent variables. The first four
questions asked about the likelihood of the subject to vote, campaign, donate, and encourage
their peers to vote in the election. The fifth question asked about the perceived relative morality
or intelligence of the candidate presented on the flyer, depending on which experiment was
treated first. This fifth question is intended to gauge how successfully the morality or intelligence
cue was received. Finally, the sixth question on both experiments asked how much pride the
subject felt towards the fictitious candidate. Then, a second flyer from the remaining experiment
was shown and the same six questions were asked; again, the fifth question gauged the relevant
personality cue of the experiment, and thus differed depending on the experiment.
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Subject Recruitment and Data Collection
Given certain confidentiality and privacy concerns raised during the Institutional Review
Board approval process, subject recruitment for the experiment was self-selecting via a public
online link to the experiment (Appendix 2). In order to keep responses confidential and IP
addresses unmarked, an open, anonymous link on Qualtrics.com was used instead of an inviteonly process. However, a public link published on facebook and email listserv’s poses some
limitations in obtaining a robust sample. Opt-in experiments tend to draw participation from
friends of the investigator, individuals who are already politically engaged, and increases the
likelihood of a homogenous group across race, gender, sex and political ideology. I tried to
mitigate these concerns by sending the public link to peers who are enrolled in graduate schools,
other universities, and high schools across the states and asked them to publish the link on their
feeds.
Ultimately, during an eight day data collection period from February 1st to February 8th,
2017, 295 respondents completed the survey, with 3 respondents skipping 1 or more questions
each. Where respondents skipped a question, it is treated as a missing value. Below are some
cross tabulations of demographic information (Qualtrics Final Report, Qualtrics.com). For full
reference, see Appendix 1. It is important to note that white 20 and 21 year olds are
overrepresented in this sample which qualifies the generalizability of the experimental results.
Additionally, racial minority groups and individuals with low levels of education are
underrepresented.
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Self-Reported Voting Behavior of Sample
Before interpreting the data from the experiments, it is important to understand and
discuss the self-reported voting behavior of the sample. This section will offer some reasons why
the self-reported voting behavior of the sample does not reflect national voting rates. Since the
average voter turnout among youths has hovered between 30 and 50 percent of the total
population across the past fourteen national election cycles, the data from this sample should
produce similar results (U.S Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Select Years). Ideally, a
robust sample without a social desirability bias for this experiment would report voting in the
2016 election with a rate between 30 and 50 percent. However, 81.23% of all respondents
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reported voting in 2016 with only 2.39% of all respondents reporting they did not register and
another 5.80% of respondents reporting they registered, but did not vote. A few potential
explanations are offered below for the divergence from existing census data, and then a
justification is offered for the continued relevance of the study despite these data.
Many reasons may help explain why over 80% of the respondents reported voting in the
2016 election. Here, I would like to offer five. First, as discussed above, there is an oversampling
of college educated subjects. Among formally educated youths, a deeper understanding of the
issues and inclination to vote develops (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 2007). Second, as Plutzer
(2002) notes, a college degree or university environment functions as a resource, which may tip
the cost-benefit scale towards voting. On campuses, registration is significantly easier than off
campuses, and civic engagement through extracurricular activities may become normative
behavior. These factors bring down the cost of voting (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 2007, 60).
A third reason this sample may report high voter turnout is a social desirability bias.
Indeed, voting is “good” behavior, and people tend to remember or over report voting and voter
registration, even when no one is watching. Indeed, Silver, Anderson and Abramson (1986)
found that college educated subjects are the individuals most likely to over report voter
participation because it is socially desirable. College students tend to have strong political views
and “want to appear to be in conformity with social norms,” as Silver et al. write (Silver et al.
1986, 614). A fourth possible explanation for the elevated reported voter turnout in my sample is
the nature of the 2016 election. As Marcus and Mackuen (1993) note, enthusiasm and anxiety
may produce greater attentiveness on the part of the individual, and can vary from one election to
the next. This explanation would make the 2016 election cycle an exception, or highly emotional
cycle.
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A fifth contributing factor to the high rate of self-reported voting behavior is related to
the fact that most subjects are college educated. Additionally, most subjects contacted are my
peers—they may be in the Political Science Department themselves, or engaged in political
research. Peers who are most inclined to spend 5-10 minutes on a political survey are probably
the individuals interested in politics and voting.
The data from the experiment supports these explanations. On a 7-point Likert scale,
ranging from “not at all” to “a great deal,” only 8.50% of respondents reported caring a 4 or less
about the results of the 2016 presidential election. Interestingly, and conforming with Silver et
al.’s theory about education and social desirability bias, not a single 23 or 24 year old reported
caring a 3 out of 7 or less. Among 23 and 24 year olds, only one respondent reported caring a
degree of 4 on the 7 point scale, and one respondent reported caring a degree of 5 out of 7.
Ultimately, 2016 was a highly salient and emotional election cycle which may have produced
greater turnout, or at least the desire to report turning out among educated voters. The selfreported voting data are presented below (Qualtrics Report, Appendix 1). 293 of the 295
respondents answered the question; the other two respondents are treated as missing.
“On a scale of 1 to 7, how much do you care about the 2016 U.S presidential election results?”
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“In the 2016 U.S presidential election, did you…”
Variable
Value
1
2
3
4
5

Answer

Percent

Count

Vote
Register Only
Not Register
Not Sure
Not applicable; I was not eligible to register
TOTAL

81.23%
5.80%
2.39%
0.68%
9.90%
100%

238
17
7
2
29
293

The justification for reliance on a sample that is composed of individuals who are more
educated, more civically engaged, more likely to vote, and younger than the average U.S
population is twofold. First, while this sample is not a representative cross cut of the American
youth, the 2016 election cannot be considered a standard bearer for youth engagement or selfreported voting due to the high emotionality of the major candidates’ platforms and rhetoric.
More importantly, however, the data from this experiment is coupled with the ANES
cumulative data file. Therefore, while the external validity of this experiment is qualified, there
is support for its validity from the representative sample in the ANES cumulative data. The
ANES data provides the external validity of the representative sample but cannot provide a
causal link between candidate traits and turnout. This is due to the multitude of variables in an
uncontrolled environment. Thus, the ANES data offers the external validity lacking in this
experiment. This study offers the internal validity of treatment manipulation and variable
isolation. Taken together, evidence of a causal link may be found to underpin the correlation in
the representative sample of the ANES.
In summation, while the voting behavior of the sample does not reflect the true national
average for 18-24 year olds, there is still merit in the results. They offer internal validity for
drawing a causal link between the independent and dependent variables.
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Effects of Intended Morality Treatment: Experiment 1
It is important to measure if the treatment, in this case the morality cues, was internalized
as intended. This section discusses the effect and strength of the manipulation on the
respondents. Treatment manipulation was operationalized as a question during the experiment.
The final question of the experiment for all three treatment groups—control, moral cue, and
immoral cue—asked the respondent on a 7-point Likert scale how much they agreed with the
statement: “Brian Walsh demonstrates a strong moral character.” A 1 corresponded with
“strongly disagree,” and a 7 corresponded with “strongly agree.” For the purposes of this
experiment, all dependent variable response options are assumed to be interpreted with equal
difference, such that the difference between the response options 1 and 2 is the same difference
between response options 4 and 5, or any other two consecutive response values. Finally, by
asking the intended treatment question last, we can ensure that respondents do not know exactly
what the research is focused on.
The average response value of the control flyer was a 4.05, demonstrating that on average
respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. The treatment group that was
randomly assigned to the positive morality cue candidate flyer reported an average response of
4.52 on the 7-point perceived morality scale. This difference of 0.47 mean response between the
two groups is statistically significant. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis that both treatment
groups perceived the morality of their conditions similarly. The treatment group that was
randomly assigned to the immoral cue reported an average response of 2.80 on the 7-point
perceived morality question, a difference of -1.24 from the control group. Again, the difference
in mean responses is statistically significant and thus we can reject the null hypothesis that the
treatment groups perceived the conditions similarly.
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In summation, the control flyer was perceived as neither moral nor immoral, while the
moral and immoral flyer both conveyed their intended cues. The perceived immorality of the
immoral treatment was stronger than the perceived morality of the moral treatment. The intended
treatment for the first experiment was successful.
Results and Analysis: Experiment 1, Morality
Introduction
With the effectiveness of the treatment for this first experiment discussed, this paper turns
to the results and analyses of the morality experiment. First, the data will be presented and
situated within the existing literature. This paper will analyze four dependent variables: the selfreported commitment to vote, commitment to encourage peers to vote, likelihood to canvas, and
likelihood to donate. Each treatment group will be discussed within these four types of
engagement. Hypothesis 1: Among 18-24 year olds, elections with a candidate who is perceived
as highly moral or immoral will produce a stronger commitment to vote and participate than in
an election without such a candidate is discussed at each individual question level throughout the
analysis. Then, two potential moderating variables—age and race—are analyzed and discussed.
Commitment to Vote
Treatment
Control Group
Pos. Moral Cue
Neg. Moral Cue

Mean Response
(7-point scale)
4.7187
4.6588
5.1250

Treatment
Effect
-0.0592
0.4063

Standard Error

P-value

0.1683
0.2456
0.2294

0.000
0.807
0.078

95% Confidence
Interval
[4.3875
5.0500]
[-.5434
.4235]
[-.0452
.8577]

The data above show the average commitment on a 7-point scale of each treatment group.
The positive morality cue, which had its intended treatment effect, did not result in a statistically
significant difference in a commitment to vote in the fictitious gubernatorial election than the
control. The flyer containing the immoral cue, however, did increase the self-reported
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commitment to vote among the subjects. Since anxiety and enthusiasm are the two emotions that
may change voter engagement from one election cycle to another, this data set may suggest
something about youths’ interpretation of perceived candidate morality (Marcus and Mackuen
1993). One explanation for this is that the negative morality treatment had more than twice the
effect than the positive morality treatment. While both treatments worked as intended, the
stronger cue may have produced a stronger commitment to vote among 18-24 year olds.
Another possible explanation is that whereas a highly immoral candidate may produce
feelings of anxiety in a young voter, a highly moral candidate does not produce similar feelings
of enthusiasm. In a paper written for Research in Organizational Behavior at Harvard Business
School, Cuddy et al. found that emotional warmth and perceived competence are negatively
correlated (Cuddy et al. 2011). Thus, if the qualities that made the candidate appear moral, such
as volunteering on a regular basis also made him appear warm, perhaps he was viewed as less
competent than the control flyer or immoral candidate. This incompetence may be causing
decreased enthusiasm among young voters. While warmth and high sense of morality are
generally related, further research is needed to isolate the effect of a positive sense of morality on
youths’ commitment to vote.
To recap, based on a commitment to vote, evidence is found in support of hypothesis 1
for perceived candidate immorality; evidence was not found in support of hypothesis 1 for high
candidate morality.
Commitment to Encourage Peers to Vote
Treatment
Control Group
Pos. Moral Cue
Neg. Moral Cue

Mean Response
(7-point scale)
3.9375
4.3085
4.5929

Treatment
Effect
0.371
0.6554

Standard Error

P-value

0.1954
0.2860
0.2657

0.000
0.194
0.014

95% Confidence
Interval
[3.5529
4.3221]
[-0.19091 0.9350]
[-0.1324
1.1784]
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Another way of operationalizing a test of youth voter engagement is through selfreported likelihood to engage one’s peer group and encourage them to vote. If some young
person cares about an issue or election, he or she is probably more likely to spend time and effort
encouraging others to take an interest. The data from Experiment 1 show that once given a cue
about a candidates’ morality, 18 to 24 year olds are more likely to encourage their peers to vote.
The negative cue had a relatively stronger effect than the positive cue, though both cues produces
the same tendency—an increase in commitment. Since the negative morality treatment had a
greater measurable treatment effect than the positive cue, and produced a greater commitment to
vote, these results are expected.
These data are particularly interesting because it might be argued that the costs of
registration and voting are higher than the costs of encouraging peers to vote. In other words, it is
easier to encourage others to participate than to participate oneself, and this form of engagement
still comes with the benefit of feeling socially responsible and abiding by social norms among
educated youths. Based on the dependent variable “commitment to encourage peers to vote,”
evidence is found in support of hypothesis 1 for the negative cue. Further research is needed on
the effect of the positive cue.
Likelihood to Canvas
Treatment
Control Group
Pos. Moral Cue
Neg. Moral Cue

Mean Response
(7-point scale)
2.3229
2.6429
2.5398

Treatment
Effect
0.32
0.2169

Standard Error

P-value

0.1606
0.2351
0.2185

0.000
0.175
0.332

95% Confidence
Interval
[2.0068
2.6391]
[-0.1429
0.7827]
[-0.2131
0.6469]

Canvassing on behalf of a candidate has a high start-up cost and requires many resources.
It requires candidate knowledge, contact information of a local organizer, and time. Not
surprisingly then, there is an overall significant drop in likelihood to canvas among youths as
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compared with the commitment to vote or encourage peers to vote. Due to the similar mean
response values for the treatment groups who received a cue, the 0.332 and 0.175 p-values for
the treatment effects precludes the difference between the cues and the control from statistical
significance. In general, canvassing is not a priority among young voters, and they are honest
about that. Perhaps there is little to no pressure to say one is likely to canvas, eliminating social
desirability bias. Considering that this fictitious election is a low profile gubernatorial race, it is
not surprising that the average response, even when subjects were provided with a cue, have not
changed with any great strength. Later, this paper will analyze potential moderating variables,
such as age and race, that might affect participation for different types of participation. With
respect to the self-reported likelihood to canvas in this experiment, evidence is found in support
of hypothesis 1 for the positive morality cue and but not for the negative morality cue.
Likelihood of a Donation
Treatment

Mean Response
(7-point scale)

Control Group
Pos. Moral Cue
Neg. Moral Cue

2.3646
2.3529
2.5398

Treatment
Effect
-0.0117
0.1752

Standard Error

P-value

95% Confidence
Interval

0.1505
0.2196
0.2047

0.000
0.958
0.569

[2.0683
[-0.4439
[-0.5196

2.6608]
0.4206]
0.2860]

Donations require all the resources of political canvassing, with the additional resource of
money. Most young Americans in college or just beyond do not have personal expendable
income. For that reason, donating becomes a costly form of participation. Indeed, adding a cue
about morality has little to no effect on the likelihood of a financial contribution. Based on these
four proxies for youth voter engagement, a cue about candidate morality does affect voter
participation, but to a stronger degree when the costs are relatively low. Canvassing and donating
come with the highest costs, voting comes with mild costs, while a simple commitment to urge
peers to vote comes with the lowest costs.
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The effect of a morality cue on youth voter participation is most observable when the
costs of participation are low. The higher the costs to an individual for a given type of
engagement, the less likely that the perceived high or low morality trait of a candidate can sway
a young voter’s participation. Thus, when considering financial contributions as a form of
participation, no evidence for hypothesis 1 if found for either treatment group. In the following
two subsections, the effects of age and race are discussed as potential moderating variables.
Since the likelihood to donate and canvas are consistently low among all three treatment groups,
they are not discussed in the following sections on moderating variables.
Moderating Variable: Age
Hypothesis 4: Among 18-24 year olds, age will have a moderating effect on the
interaction between the candidate traits and self-reported political participation is discussed in
this section for the first experiment concerning the morality of political candidates. This
hypothesis is based on existing literature that suggests personal identity or group membership
can affect voting behavior (Bass and Casper 1999; McDonald 2014). Evidence is found in
support of hypothesis 4; specifically, older subjects were more likely to vote when given a
morality cue than younger subjects. One explanation for this is that 23 and 24 year olds have
more political knowledge, independence, and control of their finances than 18 and 19 year olds.
In order to assess whether or not age had a moderating effect on the dependent variables, first the
mean response values of the youngest and oldest age groups are compared. Then, a
multiplicative regression is used to compare three age categories at once. The two forms of
participation with the greatest degree of change within the morality treatment groups—
commitment to vote and likelihood to encourage peers to vote—also show the greatest degree of
difference between the oldest and youngest subjects in the sample. One explanation for this
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phenomenon is that the oldest group may be experiencing social desirability bias. Once the cue is
internalized, 23-24 year olds are expected to respond to it. Therefore, it is expected that the lower
cost forms of participation sway these older individuals more than the younger individuals. The
youngest subjects in each treatment group also picked up the positive morality cue with
significant strength. Perhaps because they aren’t used to responding to political information,
there isn’t as strong a translation to voting behavior as older individuals among the sample. The
data support hypothesis 1: In the presence of the high and low treatments, the effect is observed
(increased commitment to vote).
The interaction of age with the treatment effects also brings to the fore that the oldest
subjects were the greatest contributors to the observed changes in participation. Despite 23 and
24 year olds deeper political understanding than 18-19 year olds, they still respond with greater
political engagement when exposed to the morality treatments, unlike middle aged or elderly
cohorts. Indeed, older cohorts demonstrate a stronger and less volatile commitment to vote
regardless of candidate personality cues, as observed in the ANES data. Ultimately, 23 and 24
year olds have enough political knowledge to process the cue, but may have yet to develop
consistent voting habits like their older counterparts, termed persistence voting. Below are the
treatment effects on the youngest and oldest groups. The interaction among three age categories
of the sample is presented below in a multiplicative regression table.
Treatment Effect of Morality Cue, 18 and 19 year olds
Treatment

Mean Response
(7-point scale)

Control Group

4

Pos. Moral Cue
Neg. Moral Cue

4.6667
3.1765

Treatment
Effect
0.6667
-0.8235

Standard Error

P-value

95% Confidence
Interval

0.2272

0.000

[3.548

4.4521]

0.3470
0.3068

0.058
0.009

[-0.0239
[-1.4340

1.3573]
-0.2130]
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Treatment Effect of Morality Cue, 23 and 24 year olds
Treatment

Mean Response
(7-point scale)

Control Group

3.7

Pos. Moral Cue
Neg. Moral Cue

4.8333
2.25

Treatment
Effect
1.1333
-1.45

Standard Error

P-value

95% Confidence
Interval

0.3225

0.000

[3.0195

4.3805]

0.5266
0.6033

0.046
0.028

[0.0221
[-2.7230

2.2445]
-0.1770]

Treatment Effect of Morality Cue, Interaction Model: Age
Treatment

Mean
Response (7point scale)

Interaction
Term

18-19 yrs, Control

4

18-19 yrs, Pos. Cue

4.6667

Pos

18-19 yrs, Neg. Cue

3.1765

20-22 yrs, Control

Treatment
Effect

Standard P-Value
Error

95% Confidence
Interval

0.2084

0.000

[3.5899

0.6667

0.3183

0.037

[0.04011 1.2932]

Neg

-0.8235

0.2814

0.004

[-1.3774 -0.2696]

4.1404

20-22

0.1404

0.2545

0.582

[-0.3605 0.6412]

20-22 yrs, Pos. Cue

4.5172

20-22xPos

-0.2898

0.3790

0.445

[-1.0357 0.4562]

20-22 yrs, Neg. Cue

2.6667

20-22xNeg

-0.6502

0.3417

0.058

[-1.3227 0.0224]

23-24 yrs, Control

3.7

23-24

-0.3

0.4062

0.461

[-1.1000 0.4996]

23-24 yrs, Pos. Cue

4.8333

23-24xPos

0.4667

0.6524

0.475

[-0.8174 1.7507]

23-24 yrs, Neg. Cue

2.25

23-24xNeg

-0.6265

0.7105

0.379

[-2.0249 0.7720]

4.4101]

The multiplicative regression shows the mean responses between the age categories for
all three treatment groups. Based on the mean responses, the treatments had the same tendencies
for the positive and negative cues among the three age groups. Age had a moderating effect on
the perceived morality of the negative treatment flyers. Among all age groups, the negative
treatment group produced the greatest degree of statistically significant difference among 20-22
year olds. Not shown here, the negative effect on 20-22 year olds yielded a p-value of 0.000. In
part, this may be because most of the sample fell in this age demographic. Therefore, any outliers
did not pull the mean too far in either direction. Indeed, only 20 respondents were 23 or 24 years
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old. Therefore, any individual’s response bears more weight on the mean than for other age
categories. Interestingly, though only a few years apart, 20-22 year olds responded to the
negative and positive morality cue with a bit more strength than 18-19 year olds. However, 1819 year olds responded similarly towards the control group as 20-22 year olds. The difference
between 20-22 year olds and 23-24 year olds was not statistically significant for either treatment
effect. This paper turns to discuss whether age is also moderating the effect of two low-cost
forms of participation: a commitment to vote and the likelihood to encourage peers to vote.
Commitment to Vote, Interaction Model: Age
Treatment

Interaction
Term

18-19 yrs, Control

Mean
Response (7
point scale)
4.3571

18-19 yrs, Pos. Cue

3.9523

Pos

18-19 yrs, Neg. Cue 4.5151
20-22 yrs, Control
20-22 yrs, Pos. Cue

Treatment
Effect

Standard P-Value
Error

95% Confidence
Interval

0.3056

0.000

[3.756

-0.4047

0.4668

0.387

[-1.3235 0.5140]

Neg

0.1580

0.4154

0.704

[-0.6597 0.9758]

4.8947

20-22

0.5376

0.3731

0.151

[-0.1969 1.2720]

4.8275

20-22xPos

0.3376

0.5557

0.544

[-0.7562 1.4314]

20-22 yrs, Neg. Cue 5.3067

20-22xNeg

0.2539

0.5033

0.614

[-0.7368 1.2446]

23-24 yrs, Control

4.6000

23-24

0.2429

0.5957

0.684

[-0.9296 1.4153]

23-24 yrs, Pos. Cue

5.5000

23-24xPos

1.3048

0.9566

0.174

[-0.5781 3.1877]

23-24 yrs, Neg. Cue 6.7500

23-24xNeg

1.9920

1.0429

0.057

[-0.0608 4.0448]

4.9586]

The commitment to vote among different age groups is shown above. There is evidence
that age had a moderating effect on the treatment effect for the negative morality cue. Indeed, the
treatment effect was 1.9920 for 23-24 year olds x Negative Cue for the dependent variable
“commitment to vote,” with a p-value of 0.057. This is consistent with the data in the table on
the previous page. 23-24 year olds internalized the negative cue with great strength degree, and
perhaps their commitment to vote, as older individuals, is easier to sway with a negative morality
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cue than younger subjects. This may be because the costs of voting for 23-24 year olds are easier
to overcome than for 18-19 year olds; they may already be registered from a previous election
and more likely to have a permanent address than young college students. Additional testing in
STATA programming shows that the difference in a commitment to vote for the immoral flyer
between 20-22 year olds and 23-24 year olds is also statistically significant. The p-value for the
moderating effect between 20-22 year olds x Negative Cue and 23-24 year olds x Negative Cue
is .0826. Among individuals in the positive treatment group, there was no observed difference in
treatment effect between 20-22 year olds and 23-24 year olds.
Furthermore, 23-24 year olds reported the greatest increase in commitment to vote when
shown the positive cue compared to the other age groups. The p-value for the positive cue
treatment effect on 23-24 year olds was 0.212, while the p-value for the treatment effect on the
youngest group was 0.410, and 0.825 among 18-19 year olds. While none of these values are
statistically significant, the greater commitment to vote among 23-24 year olds in the positive
treatment group may be a testament to the cost-benefit analysis theory of voting. Since each
group internalized the positive morality cue, some other information helped motivate the
commitment to vote among 23-24 year olds. In other words, hypothesis 1 is most supported by
the increased commitment to vote among this oldest age category.
To conclude, there is evidence of a moderating effect of age on a commitment to vote for
the negative morality cue treatment. Thus, Hypothesis 4: Among 18-24 year olds, age will have a
moderating effect on the interaction between the candidate traits and self-reported political
participation is supported. In general, 23-24 year olds report an overall greater likelihood to vote
compared to younger respondents. Now, this paper turns to the effect of age on the likelihood to
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encourage one’s peers to vote—the least costly form of political participation studied in this
experiment.
Commitment to Encourage Peers to Vote, Interaction Model: Age
Treatment

Interaction
Term

18-19 yrs, Control

Mean
Response (7
point scale)
3.75

18-19 yrs, Pos. Cue

3.6667

Pos

18-19 yrs, Neg. Cue

3.6765

20-22 yrs, Control

Treatment
Effect

Standard P-Value
Error

95% Confidence
Interval

0.3546

0.000

[3.0519

-0.0833

0.5417

0.878

[-1.1496 0.9830]

Neg

0.0735

0.4789

0.878

[-1.0161 0.8691]

4.0175

20-22

0.2675

0.4331

0.537

[-0.5849 1.1200]

20-22 yrs, Pos. Cue

4.3859

20-22xPos

0.4517

0.6458

0.485

[-0.8194 1.7229]

20-22 yrs, Neg. Cue

4.9600

20-22xNeg

1.0160

0.5814

0.082

[-0.1285 2.1605]

23-24 yrs, Control

4

23-24

0.25

0.6913

0.718

[-1.1108 1.6108]

23-24 yrs, Pos. Cue

5.8333

23-24xPos

1.9167

1.1101

0.085

[-0.2686 4.1019]

23-24 yrs, Neg. Cue

5.5000

23-24xNeg

1.5735

1.2090

0.194

[-0.8063 3.9534]

4.4480]

In a comparison of the different age groups in the control condition, the likelihood of
young voters to encourage their peers to vote is similar. However, age produced a moderating
effect on the likelihood to encourage peers to vote among the positive and negative cue
treatments. Among individuals in the youngest age group, the likelihood to encourage peers to
vote actually decreased in both treatment groups when compared to the control flyer, though
with little strength. For the middle and older age groups, both the positive and negative morality
treatments resulted in an increase in likelihood to encourage peers to vote. Additional statistical
tests in Stata (2014) shows no statistical significance between the treatment effects on 20-22 year
olds and 23-24 years. Not surprisingly, and consistent with the personal commitment to vote, the
morality cues produced the greatest change in response among 23 and 24 year olds.
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For college educated individuals, encouraging peers to vote is socially desirable and low
cost. On the other hand, 18 and 19 year olds are not in a politically engaged environment, and
thus may feel less pressure to discuss the election in a peer group. One final point worth noting:
because 23-24 year olds increased their political participation to the greatest degree when given a
morality treatment, it can be deduced that the overall treatment effects for both a “commitment to
vote” and a “commitment to encourage peers to vote” are disproportionately the effect of older
respondents’ answers.
Moderating Variable: Race
In this part Hypothesis 5: Among 18-24 year olds, race will have a moderating effect on
the interaction between the candidate traits and self-reported political participation is discussed
for the first experiment on morality. Ultimately, evidence is found in support of the hypothesis.
As Wattenberg notes in his 2006 book Is Voting for Young People, individuals tend to vote when
they care about an issue (Wattenberg 2006). In many cases, people care and vote on issues that
reflect personal or group interests. Social Identity Voting (SIV), a recent theory that grew out of
Social Identity Theory, suggests feelings of personal and group identity may affect voting
behavior among legislators. Pauls et al. maintain this theory in their study which examines social
identity voting in roll call votes at the congressional level (Pauls et al. 2015, 3). If group
membership and identity can motivate voting behavior among politicians, it is worth analyzing
the potential of Social Identity Voting among constituents, including youths.
Due to the disproportionately high number of white respondents in the sample, race will
be analyzed by reference to ‘whites’ and ‘nonwhites.’ This will gauge the differences between
white and minority turnout behavior. It is widely accepted that Hispanics, Asians and Blacks do
not have the same voting behavior, or registration rates, and this study acknowledges that (Bass
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and Casper, 1999; United States Election Project 2014). The intention is not to treat minorities as
a single social identity, but rather to generate a more accurate, though less precise, understanding
of the effect of race on voter turnout. One way of gauging if races respond differently to
candidates is by looking at self-reported levels of interest in the 2016 presidential election
results. Since President Trump has made particularly inflammatory race-related comments, a
greater interest among minorities in the 2016 election might be the result of Social Identity
Voting. While less than 5% of voters from both groups reported caring a 3 or less on a 7-point
scale, the percentage of those who reported caring a great deal (7) is about 7% greater for
minorities. Below are the data.
On a scale of 1-7, how much do you care about the 2016 U.S presidential election results?
Whites
Response
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Frequency
0
1
5
13
39
21
148

Nonwhites
Percent
0%
0.42%
2.11%
5.49%
16.46%
13.08%
62.45%

Response
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Frequency
1
0
1
4
7
4
40

Percent
1.75%
0%
1.75%
7.02%
12.28%
7.02%
70.18%

If the discrepancy in caring deeply about the 2016 national election between white and
nonwhite youths is a product of internalized social identity, then perhaps whites and nonwhites
will respond differently to the treatments in the first experiment. Given that minority groups have
been systematically discriminated against, a heightened awareness of candidates’ personality and
voter participation might be expected among nonwhites when shown a highly moral or immoral
candidate. While both whites and nonwhites responded with the expected tendencies to the
manipulation check question, the immoral candidate produced a stronger negative reaction from
nonwhites. The highly moral candidate, however, produced a stronger positive reaction among
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whites. So, among the race categories, whites responded more positively to the “good guy” than
nonwhites, and nonwhites responded more negatively to the “bad guy” than whites.
One interpretation of these results is that young minority voters feel more skepticism
towards the morality of politicians than whites. In September 2016, the New York Times
published an article revealing voter apathy towards their party’s candidate—Hillary Clinton. One
young woman told the Times, “What am I supposed to do if I don’t like him and I don’t trust
her?” The same article noted that young black voters expect a greater amount of diversity among
candidates than in previous elections: “gone are the days of patience,” said former PARepresentative Tony J. Payton Jr., for “boilerplate pleas” on racial equality (J. Martin 2016).
This disaffection towards white candidates, even in one’s own party among young AfricanAmericans, may be generalized to other races. However, further research is needed to support
this theory. The underrepresentation of minorities in this experiment may be skewing the data.
Treatment Effect of Morality Cues, Among Whites
Treatment

Mean Response
(7-point scale)

Control Group

4.0493

Pos. Moral Cue
Neg. Moral Cue

4.6666
2.8666

Treatment
Effect
0.6167
-1.1827

Standard Error

P-value

95% Confidence
Interval

0.1222

0.000

[3.8087

4.2900]

0.1823
0.1684

0.001
0.000

[0.2581
[-1.5144

0.9765]
-0.8510]

Standard Error

P-value

95% Confidence
Interval

0.2903

0.000

[3.4846

4.6487]

0.3884
0.3732

0.615
0.000

[-0.5821
[-2.2496

0.9751]
-0.7533]

Treatment Effect of Morality Cues, Among Nonwhites
Treatment

Mean Response
(7-point scale)

Control Group

4.0667

Pos. Moral Cue
Neg. Moral Cue

4.2632
2.5652

Treatment
Effect
0.1965
-1.5015
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Commitment to Vote, Interaction Model: Race
Treatment

Interaction
Term

Nonwhite, Control

Mean
Response (7point scale)
4.8667

Nonwhite, Pos. Cue

3.9474

Pos.

Nonwhite, Neg. Cue

5.1044

White, Control

Treatment Standard P-value
Effect
Error

95% Confidence
Interval

0.4243

0.000

[4.0315

5.7018]

-0.9193

0.5676

0.106

[-2.0364 0.1979]

Neg.

0.4377

0.5453

0.423

[-0.6358 1.5112]

4.6914

White

-0.1753

0.4619

0.705

[-1.0845 0.7339]

White, Pos. Cue

4.8636

WhitexPos.

1.0916

0.6296

0.084

[-0.1477 2.3308]

White, Neg. Cue

5.0787

WhitexNeg. -0.0539

0.6009

0.933

[-1.2332 1.13243]

Before discussing the moderating effect of race on morality cues and the change in a
commitment to vote, it is interesting to note the difference between whites and nonwhites in the
control. Nonwhites were more likely report a commitment to vote than whites. This may be
associated with anxieties that minorities feel towards election outcomes that whites do not.
Recall that nonwhites reported caring more about the results of the 2016 U.S election than
whites.
For individuals in the negative treatment group, there is no evidence that race had a
moderating effect on the independent variables for a reported commit to vote. This is observed
by the fact that the interaction effect was very small (White x Neg. : -0.0539), and the associated
p-values and 95% confidence interval show no statistical significance. For individuals in the
positive morality treatment group, race did have a moderating effect on the relationship between
candidate morality and a commitment to vote. Whites in the positive cue group self-reported an
average of 1.0916 points greater commitment to vote than nonwhites. The moderating effect was
statistically significant with a p-value of 0.084. This difference may be explained by the fact that
whites found the highly moral candidate 0.4034 points more moral than nonwhites. Among the
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flyers, this was the greatest difference in treatment manipulation effect between whites and
nonwhites. This provides support for hypothesis 5.
Among nonwhites, the positive morality cue—whose treatment was unsuccessful—
resulted in a significantly lower commitment to vote compared to the control group. This may be
due to skepticism felt towards candidates portraying themselves as highly moral, as discussed in
the previous section. The negative morality cue resulted in a slightly higher commitment to vote
among non-whites, but with a treatment effect of only 0.4377 and p-value of 0.423, this increase
is not statistically significant. Perhaps among nonwhites, a candidate portraying themselves as
moral, while not actually viewed as highly moral, manages to create voter apathy due to
historical context and perceived social identity. Indeed, all six flyers present middle aged white
men. The effects of perceived social identity should be studied further. Among whites, the
positive and negative treatment effects worked as intended, and an increased commitment to vote
for both the moral and immoral candidate is observed. This provides support for hypothesis 1:
Among 18-24 year olds, elections with a candidate who is perceived as highly moral or immoral
will produce a stronger commitment to vote and participate than in an election without such a
candidate for whites.
In summation, race had a moderating effect on the commitment to vote for individuals in
the positive treatment group: nonwhites were less likely to vote when exposed to the moral
candidate than whites. Race had no impact on the change in a commitment to vote for the
negative morality cue group. In the next section, this paper turns to the moderating effect of race
on the other low-cost form of participation studied—the likelihood to encourage peers to vote.
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Commitment to Encourage Peers to Vote, Interaction Model: Race
Treatment

Interaction
Term

Nonwhite, Control

Mean
Response
(7-point
scale)
3.86667

Nonwhite, Pos. Cue

3.2106

Pos

Nonwhite, Neg. Cue

4.9566

White, Control

Treatment Standard P-value 95% Confidence
Effect
Error
Interval
0.4890

0.000

[4.0315

5.7018]

-0.6561

0.6541

0.317

[-2.0364

0.1979]

Neg

1.0899

0.6285

0.084

[-0.6358

1.5112]

3.9507

White

0.0840

0.5323

0.875

[-1.0845

0.7339]

White, Pos. Cue

4.6309

WhitexPos

1.3363

0.7262

0.067

[-0.1477

2.3308]

White, Neg. Cue

4.5060

WhitexNeg

-0.5405

0.6922

0.436

[-1.2332 1.1324]

Within the control group, whites and nonwhites responded similarly to a commitment to
encourage peers to vote. Within the negative treatment group, no statistically significant
evidence is found in support of hypothesis 5. This is observed by the statistically insignificant
interaction term of -0.5405, and a high p-value of 0.436. However, race did have a moderating
effect on the positive morality cue. The mean response difference between whites and nonwhites
in the positive treatment group was 1.4203 for a commitment to encourage peers to vote, with a
statistically significant difference (P-value: 0.067). Again, the moderating effect might be
attributed to a lack of trust towards the intentionality of “wholesome white politicians” among
nonwhites, who reported a lower commitment to encourage peers to vote than whites. The New
York Times article by Jonathan Martin supports this hypothesis for the 2016 presidential election
(J. Martin 2016). If nonwhites are unsure of the intention of highly moral white candidates, these
individuals may be less likely to engage with peers about the election.
Again, in the negative morality treatment group, there is no evidence that race had a
moderating role on the commitment to encourage peers to vote. Indeed, both whites and
nonwhites responded to the negative cue with the same tendency and similar strengths.
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Specifically, whites and nonwhites were both more likely to encourage peers to vote when given
a negative morality cue than when given no cue at all. We may expect that nonwhites are far
more concerned when a candidate appears immoral than when a candidate is trying to ride the
moral high ground. Additionally, openly immoral candidates may produce the same uncertainty
among nonwhites about their political intentions that they produce among nonwhites.
For whites, then, evidence for hypothesis 1: Among 18-24 year olds, elections with a
candidate who is perceived as highly moral or immoral will produce a stronger commitment to
vote and participate than in an election without such a candidate is observed for the
participation variable “encouraging peers to vote.” However, evidence for hypothesis 1 is found
only in part for nonwhites. Among nonwhites, while a negative cue does increase the
commitment to encourage peers to vote (treatment effect: -0.6561, p-value: 0.317), the positive
cue did not. Ultimately, race is a moderating variable. It’s interaction effect is observed in the
White x Pos interaction term, where the effect on the dependent variable has different tendencies
and strengths between minorities and non-minorities.
Conclusions
Evidence for hypotheses 4 and 5 is found in the interaction models for race and age. After
looking at the data for the first experiment, the strongest evidence is found in support of
hypothesis 1 for white respondents and the oldest respondents, aged 23 and 24, for the two lowcost forms of participation. Ultimately, among young individuals, minorities, and the high-cost
forms of participation like donation and canvassing, little evidence is observed in support of
hypothesis 1.
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Intended Effects of Treatment: Experiment 2
This section begins by discussing the outcome of the intended treatment effects for the
experiment on candidate intelligence. Then, based on the results of the manipulation check, some
reasons for these results are discussed.
The question measuring the treatment of the intelligence experiment, read: “On a scale of
1 to 7, how strongly do you agree with the following statement: ‘Michael Tipson demonstrates a
high level of intelligence.’” Mirroring the first experiment, a 1 was labeled “strongly disagree”
while a 7 was labeled “strongly agree.” The average response for the control group’s flyer was a
4.02, perceived on average as neither intelligent nor unintelligent. The highly intelligent cue
received an average response of 5.05, a 1.03 increase from the control group, with a p-value of
0.000, thus the treatment worked. The unintelligent cue, however, was perceived an average of
only -.13 points less intelligent than the control flyer. With a p-value of 0.391, the unintelligent
cue was perceived no differently than the control flyer.
Ultimately, the control flyer and highly intelligent treatment were perceived as intended,
while the unintelligent treatment was not successful. One potential reason why the unintelligent
treatment had little effect is due to the nature of the experiment. It’s difficult to make a candidate
appear unintelligent on an advertisement promoting that candidate; it’s possible that subjects
perceived the intended cue as some other information. For example, perhaps Tipson’s
inexperience was perceived among the treatment group as anti-establishment instead of
unintelligent.
Results and Analysis: Experiment 2, Intelligence
Introduction
With the effectiveness of the treatment for this second experiment outlined, this
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section focuses on the results and analyses of the intelligence experiment. First, the data will be
presented and critically engaged with by analyzing the self-reported commitment to vote,
likelihood of encouraging peers to vote, likelihood to canvas, and likelihood to donate. Each
treatment group will be discussed within these four types of engagement. Hypothesis 2: Among
18-24 year olds, elections with a candidate who is perceived as intelligent or unintelligent will
produce a stronger commitment to vote and participate than in an election without such a
candidate is discussed at each individual question level throughout the analysis, with the
understanding that the negative cue treatment results will limit the scope of possible conclusions.
Commitment to Vote
Treatment

Mean Response
(7-point scale)

Control Group

4.9118

Pos. Intelligence Cue 4.9134
Neg. Intelligence Cue 4.9091

Treatment
Effect

0.0016
-0.0027

Standard
Error

P-value

95% Confidence
Interval

0.1570

0.000

[3.8087

4.2900]

0.2210
0.2307

0.994
0.991

[-0.4332
[-1.5144

0.4366]
-0.8510]

When compared to the control group, the positive treatment had no effect on a
commitment to vote. The negative cue—which did not have the intended effect—also resulted in
no difference of commitment to vote from the control. This is interesting because whatever
information the cue is in fact evoking to the respondents, such as an anti-establishment cue, is
not affecting a commitment to vote among youths. No evidence is found in support of hypothesis
2 for a higher “commitment to vote.”
Likelihood to Encourage Peers to Vote
Treatment

Mean Response
(7-point scale)

Control Group

4.2970

Pos. Intelligence Cue 4.3173
Neg. Intelligence Cue 4.5341

Treatment
Effect
0.0203
0.2371

Standard
Error

P-value

95% Confidence
Interval

0.1781

0.000

[3.9464

4.6476]

0.2501
0.2611

0.935
0.365

[-0.4332
[-0.2768

0.4366]
0.7509]
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The control group, with a mean response of 4.2970, is not a statistically different
outcome from the positive intelligence cue. Interestingly, the negative treatment group responded
on average with a 0.2371 increase in a likelihood to encourage peers to vote. While the strength
of the increase in participation is small, it suggests that the negative intelligence cue conveyed
something different than the control. This increase among the negative intelligence treatment
group for this question is similarly observed for the canvassing question. For canvassing,
however, the negative intelligence cue regression coefficient had greater strength.
Likelihood to Canvas
Treatment

Mean Response
(7-point scale)

Control Group

2.3267

Pos. Intelligence Cue 2.4327
Neg. Intelligence Cue 2.7386

Treatment
Effect
0.1060
0.4119

Standard
Error

P-value

95% Confidence
Interval

0.1540

0.000

[2.0236

2.6299]

0.2162
0.2257

0.624
0.069

[-0.3196
[-0.0323

0.5315]
0.8561]

The likelihood to canvas on behalf of a candidate in this fictitious election is overall
lower than a commitment to vote or encourage peers to vote. This parallels the results of the
morality experiment, as canvassing is a high-cost form of participation for young individuals.
While the mean response for the positive intelligence treatment group was only a 0.1060 greater
than the control group, the intended negative cue resulted in a 0.4119 increase in a likelihood to
canvas. If the unintelligence cue did in fact convey an anti-establishment cue to the treatment
group, this result is interesting. Perhaps young individuals weighed the cost and benefit of
canvassing for the candidates. For an anti-establishment or non-politician, canvassing may seem
more fruitful, or be of greater value, than canvassing for an established politician. If this is the
case, then the subjects in the negative intelligence treatment group demonstrated a cost-benefit
analysis in their political participation behavior.
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Likelihood of a Donation
Treatment

Mean Response
(7-point scale)

Control Group

2.4510

Pos. Intelligence Cue 2.2212
Neg. Intelligence Cue 2.3068

Treatment
Effect
-0.2298
-0.1442

Standard
Error

P-value

95% Confidence
Interval

0.1450

0.000

[2.1656

2.736]

0.2040
0.2130

0.261
0.499

[-0.6314
[-0.5634

0.1718]
0.2751]

The self-reported likelihood of a donation among 18-24 year olds is very low, on par with
the likelihood to canvas for a candidate. As a high-cost form of participation that requires many
resources, financial contributions are rare among youths. The fact that youths don’t donate
money to political campaigns—and politicians don’t expect them to—may contribute to youths
feeling as though politicians ignore them. In general, politicians tailor their priorities and
message to likely voters and likely donors. In fact, in an article by Susie Poppick for the CNBC
network, likely donors appear to be even more valued among politicians than likely voters.
Harvard Professor Stephen Ansolabehere tells Poppick, “Money is fungible in a way that votes
aren’t,” because money can buy votes in a way that a single vote cannot. On average, $10 has
been spent in modern elections for every vote won (Poppick 2016). Thus, even if younger voters
were likely to make only a small donation, politicians would pay far more attention to their
interests—and perhaps be more accessible to their demographic—in the hopes of reelection. In
turn, younger voters would be brought into the fold of politics. Below is the average “cost” of a
vote for the 2016 primaries (Poppick 2016; Federal Election Commission, CNBC Calculations).
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Dollars Spent Per Popular Vote, 2016

This study, however, resulted in a decreased likelihood of a donation when given a
positive intelligence cue or a negative intelligence cue among 18 to 24 year olds. If we think
political participation would likely be consistent across multiple proxies (dependent variables)—
that is, someone who is more inclined to vote in an election would also be more inclined to
canvas or donate—then this data is inconsistent. Indeed, as discussed under the previous
subsections, individuals in the positive treatment group responded with an increased commitment
to canvas and encourage peers to vote when compared to the control group. However, because
the difference in mean responses between the treatment groups is small for each question, further
study in needed. The results may be spurious.
Moderating Variable: Age
After by-sorting the data by age category using STATA programming, 20-22 year olds
were the only category that responded to both intelligence treatment cues as the study intended.
One possible explanation for this is that 20-22 year olds make up the largest proportion of
respondents, with 191 of the 295 total respondents making up this age group. This middle age
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category is most likely to be representative of the true population. Each individual response is
weighted less heavily and the results are less likely to be skewed by outliers.
Treatment Effect of Intelligence Cues Among 20-22 Year Olds
Treatment

Mean Response
(7-point scale)

Control Group

4.2623

Pos. Intelligence Cue 5.1111
Neg. Intelligence Cue 3.8070

Treatment
Effect
0.8488
-0.4562

Standard
Error

P-value

95% Confidence
Interval

0.1330

0.000

[3.9999

4.5247]

0.1807
0.1913

0.000
0.018

[0.4922
[-0.8328

1.2054]
-0.0778]

The increase in perceived intelligence among 20-22 year olds of the positive intelligence
candidate was 0.8488 points, a strong difference, and thus the treatment had a different effect on
this treatment group than the control group. The negative cue also produced the intended change
of tendency among 20-22 year olds, with a decrease of 0.4553 points in mean response. Since the
treatment effects worked on this age group, analyzing the commitment the vote through an
interaction model for the different age groups will indicate if the intended treatments resulted in
an increased likelihood to vote.
Commitment to Vote, Interaction Model: Age
Treatment

Interaction
Term

18-19 yrs, Control

Mean
Response (7point scale)
4.6176

18-19 yrs, Pos. Cue

4

Pos

18-19 yrs, Neg. Cue

4.6086

20-22 yrs, Control

Treatment Standard P-Value 95% Confidence
Effect
Error
Interval
0.2662

0.000

[4.0936

5.1416]

-0.6176

0.4044

0.128

[-1.4136 0.1784]

Neg

-0.0090

0.4154

0.983

[-0.8338 0.8159]

5

20-22

0.3824

0.3322

0.251

[-0.2716 1.0363]

20-22 yrs, Pos. Cue

5.2083

20-22xPos

0.8260

0.4863

0.091

[-0.1313 1.7832]

20-22 yrs, Neg. Cue

4.8947

20-22xNeg

-0.0963

0.5073

0.850

[-1.0949 0.9023]

23-24 yrs, Control

5.3333

23-24

0.7157

0.6873

0.299

[-0.6373 2.0686]

23-24 yrs, Pos. Cue

5.3333

23-24xPos

0.6176

0.9832

0.530

[-1.3177 2.5529]

23-24 yrs, Neg. Cue

5.8750

23-24xNeg

0.5506

0.9372

0.557

[-1.2941 2.3954]
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Before considering the moderating effect of age on a commitment to vote, consider the
mean responses among 20-22 year olds for a commitment to vote. It is important to observe the
differences in the treatment groups among 20-22 year olds because this group perceived the
treatments as the experiment intended. Since the manipulation worked for this age category, the
results will reflect causal effect of the intended treatment cues. Among 20-22 year olds, the
positive cue mean result was 0.2083 higher than the control for a commitment to vote. Among
20-22 year olds, the unintelligent flyer resulted in a 0.1053 decrease in a commitment to vote.
Based on the available data, then, evidence for hypothesis 2 is not found for both treatment cues.
While the positive cue resulted in an increased commitment to vote among 20-22 year olds, the
negative cue did not. Strikingly, among 18-19 year olds and 23-24 year olds, the positive cue did
not produce a greater inclination to vote.
Age is moderating the effect of the treatments on a commitment to vote for the positive
treatment group. Note the statistically significant p-value of 0.091, showing 20-22 year olds
responded differently to the positive cue than 18-19 year olds. Interestingly, the older the
respondent the more likely they are to commit to vote for all three treatments. Their baseline
political engagement is higher than younger individuals. 18-19 year olds average response for the
control group is only 4.617, 20-22 year olds average response is a 5, and 23-24 year olds selfreport a commitment of 5.3333 on the 7-point Likert scale. Additional statistical tests show no
moderating effect of age between 20-22 year olds and 23-24 year olds for either treatment flyer.
For the intelligence cue experiment, support for Hypothesis 4: Among 18-24 year olds, age will
have a moderating effect on the interaction between the candidate traits and self-reported
political participation is found for the positive cue but not the negative cue.
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Among 18-19 year old individuals, the positive cue resulted in a decreased commitment
to vote when compared to the control. Among 20-22 year olds, the positive cue resulted in an
increased commitment to vote compared to the control group. Finally, among 23-24 year olds,
the positive cue resulted in no change when compared to those individuals who received the
control flyer. This means each age group responded to the positive cue with a different tendency
for a “commitment to vote.” The negative treatment had similarly different effects among the age
groups when compared to the control flyer.
To summarize, unlike morality, intelligence cues had little effect on a commitment to
vote. The data show little consistency or pattern in responses among treatments or across age
categories. This is not surprising since the age categories internalized the treatments differently
from one another.
Along with a commitment to vote, encouraging peers to vote is a comparatively low-cost
form of participation that generally produced a larger commitment to participate than donating or
canvassing. A compelling question is if, and how, age affected the willingness of young people
to encourage their peers to vote. Since the morality experiment resulted in a significantly greater
commitment among the oldest age group, this study hypothesizes that a similar interaction will
be observed for the intelligence experiment.
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Commitment to Encourage Peers to Vote, Interaction Model: Age
Treatment

Interaction
Term

18-19 yrs, Control

Mean
Response
(7-point
scale)
3.8485

18-19 yrs, Pos. Cue

3.5769

Pos

18-19 yrs, Neg. Cue

4.1739

20-22 yrs, Control

Treatment
Effect

Standard
Error

P-Value

95% Confidence
Interval

0.3082

0.000

[3.2419

-0.2716

0.4642

0.559

[-1.1853 0.6422]

Neg

0.3254

0.4808

0.499

[-0.6211 1.2719]

4.4590

20-22

0.6105

0.3825

0.112

[-0.1425 1.3635]

20-22 yrs, Pos. Cue

4.6111

20-22xPos

0.4237

0.5571

0.448

[-0.1313 1.7832]

20-22 yrs, Neg. Cue

4.5614

20-22xNeg

-0.2230

0.5810

0.701

[-1.0949 0.9023]

23-24 yrs, Control

5.1667

23-24

1.3182

0.7856

0.094

[-0.2283 2.8646]

23-24 yrs, Pos. Cue

4

23-24xPos

-0.8951

1.1226

0.426

[-3.1047 1.3145]

23-24 yrs, Neg. Cue

5.3750

23-24xPos

-0.1171

1.0701

0.913

[-2.2236 1.9894]

4.4550]

Unlike the “commitment to vote” dependent variable, age had no moderating effect on
the treatment for the “commitment to encourage peers to vote” variable. Additional testing shows
that the difference in treatment effect between 20-22 year olds and 23-24 year olds is also not
statistically significant. However, older subjects were more likely to report encouraging peers to
vote in general. This is not related to the treatment effects, but instead reflects that older subjects’
overall willingness to encourage peers to vote is higher than for younger subjects. The positive
correlation between age and mean response may be environmental. As peers age and begin
voting, obtaining and exercising political knowledge in conversation becomes a social norm—
especially among those with a college degree. Among 23 and 24 year olds, encouraging peers to
vote is relatively easy, and importantly, praiseworthy. Surprisingly, however, when compared
with the control, the positive intelligence treatment group resulted in a -1.1667 decrease among
23 and 24 year olds. One possible reason for the difference between 23-24 year olds and 18-19
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year olds in the positive cue group is outliers. With only 20 respondents comprising this group, a
few individuals could greatly skew the data.
In conclusion, age did have a moderating effect on the treatment in the experiment for a
commitment to vote. Additionally, age affects the overall likelihood that an individual is willing
to encourage their peers to vote in a nonexperimental setting. However, evidence for hypothesis
5 for the dependent variable “encourage peers to vote” is not found for the positive or negative
treatment cues. Indeed, there is no evidence that age groups responded differently to the
treatment effects when asked if they would encourage peers to vote.
Moderating Variable: Race
While race proved to be a pertinent factor for the morality experiment, the same was not
found for the intelligence experiment. Thus, Hypothesis 5: Among 18-24 year olds, race will
have a moderating effect on the interaction between the candidate traits and self-reported
political participation is not backed by the data for the intelligence experiment. One theory,
threaded through this experimental analysis, is that the study did not produce the expected
negative intelligence treatment effect and thus, data interpretation must be qualified. A second
theory is that perceived morality is qualitatively different than intelligence. Historically
marginalized populations may feel a personal stake in ensuring a moral candidate is elected, and
that an immoral candidate is blocked from office. However, perceived intelligence may not
produce the same outcome. An intelligent or unintelligent candidate may not shift the incentives
of participation across racial lines. This theory is supported by the fact that the intelligence cues
were interpreted similarly between racial categories.
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Treatment Effect of Intelligence Cues, Among Whites
Treatment

Mean Response
(7-point scale)

Control Group

4.0488

Pos. Intelligence Cue
Neg. Intelligence Cue

5.0941
3.8732

Treatment
Effect
1.0453
-0.1756

Standard
Error

P-value

95% Confidence
Interval

0.1220

0.000

[3.8082

4.2892]

0.1220
0.1791

0.000
0.328

[0.7083
[-0.5284

1.3822]
0.1773]

Treatment Effect of Intelligence Cues, Among Nonwhites
Treatment

Mean Response
(7-point scale)

Control Group

3.95

Pos. Intelligence Cue
Neg. Intelligence Cue

4.8947
4

Treatment
Effect
0.9447
0.05

Standard
Error

P-value

95% Confidence
Interval

0.1810

0.000

[3.5869

4.3131]

0.2593
0.2670

0.001
0.852

[0.4245
[-0.4856

1.4650]
0.5857]

The positive intelligence treatment effect worked on whites and nonwhites where
the negative treatment effect had no effect. Since whites and nonwhites responded similarly to
the flyers in this experiment, it can be anticipated that race will have no moderating effect on the
commitment to vote and the likelihood to encourage peers to vote. If there had been a stronger or
different point of view on the candidates between whites and nonwhites, then a difference in
commitment to vote would have been expected.
Commitment to Vote, Interaction Model: Race
Treatment Group

Mean Response
(7-point scale)

Interaction
Term

Nonwhite, Control

4.7

Nonwhite, Pos. Cue

5.0

Pos

Nonwhite, Neg. Cue

4.4118

White, Control

Treatment
Effect

Standard
Error

P-value

95% Confidence
Interval

0.3548

0.000

[4.0016

0.3

0.5084

0.556

[-0.7006 1.3005]

Neg

-0.2882

0.5234

0.582

[-1.3186

4.9634

White

0.2634

0.3957

0.506

[-0.5155 1.0423]

White, Pos. Cue

4.8941

WhitexPos

-0.3692

0.5646

0.514

[-1.4805

0.7419]

White, Neg. Cue

5.0281

WhitexNeg 0.3529

0.5832

0.546

[-0.7950

1.5010]

5.3984]

0.7421]
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As hypothesized in the previous section, there is no evidence that race has a moderating
effect on a commitment to vote in Experiment 2. Each treatment group effect, sorted by race,
resulted in a 95% confidence interval that crossed 0.0. Among whites, the intelligence cues
resulted in no change compared to the control group, each mean response falling within one tenth
of a point of the control. Among nonwhites and whites, perceived positive intelligence in a
candidate does not affect a commitment to vote with significant strength. Perhaps this is because
young voters are harder to mobilize to vote. Appearing “intelligent” as an elected official is
nothing to write home about, and will not motivate nonvoters to vote. Since the unintelligent cue
was not perceived as the study intended, it is interesting that the flyer affected whites and
nonwhites’ commitment to vote differently. Whites reported a 5.0282 average commitment to
vote on a 7-point scale, while nonwhites reported a 4.4118 commitment to vote for the same
candidate. It is incumbent upon researchers in this field to design a study testing the effects of
“political outsider” candidates on youth voter turnout. The negative intelligence treatment may
have had that effect on the subjects due to the language used on the flyer.
Commitment to Encourage Peers to Vote, Interaction Model: Race
Treatment

Interaction
Term

Nonwhite, Control

Mean
Response
(7-point
scale)
4.1052

Nonwhite, Pos. Cue

4.3157

Pos

Nonwhite, Neg. Cue

4.2105

White, Control

Treatment Standard P-value
Effect
Error

95% Confidence
Interval

0.4118

0.000

[3.2946

4.915]

0.2105

0.5824

0.718

[-0.9360

1.356]

Neg

0.0124

0.5993

0.984

[-1.1672

1.192]

4.3415

White

0.2362

0.4570

0.606

[-0.6635

1.135]

White, Pos. Cue

4.3176

WhitexPos

-0.2343

0.6454

0.717

[-1.0314

1.591]

White, Neg. Cue

4.6338

WhitexNeg

0.2800

0.6663

0.675

[-0.7950

1.5010]

For the dependent variable “commitment to encourage peers to vote” the mean responses
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for whites and nonwhites within all three treatment groups are similar. There is no evidence that
race is moderating the effect of the intelligence cues on the dependent variable. In all three
treatments, the mean response for non-whites was slightly lower than the mean response for
whites. Since the negative intelligence cue did not have its intended effect, it is interesting that it
had the greatest degree of difference in mean response between whites and nonwhites. Studying
the information that was conveyed by the negative cue, and particularly whether the cue was
related to candidate personality traits, will contribute to the body of literature on voter turnout
theories.
The fact that race had a stronger moderating effect on Experiment 1 (morality cues) than
the Experiment 2 (intelligence cues) is not surprising. As discussed under the section Moderating
Variable: Race for experiment 2, intelligence and race may be qualitatively different factors.
Historically in U.S politics, the morality of a candidate affected different racial groups much
differently. Intelligence of a candidate, on the other hand, is not informed by unique racial
histories.
Conclusions
When considering the entire sample population for Experiment 2, any evidence for
hypothesis 2 must be reproduced in the future, given the failure of the negative intelligence
treatment in this study. However, for one cross section of the population, 20-22 year olds, the
negative cue treatment did work as intended as observed through the manipulation check. Thus,
meaningful conclusions can be drawn from this subsample for Experiment 2. Among 20-22 year
olds, there is no evidence in support of the hypothesis 2 for the negative treatment group.
One possible explanation for this lies in the cumulative ANES data. Recall that among
the three variables correlated with youth voter turnout—perceived candidate intelligence,
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candidate morality, and feeling pride in a candidate—intelligence had the lowest correlation.
Thus, it is expected that perceived candidate intelligence has a lower effect on political
participation than morality. However, this study pursued the possibility that taking pride in a
candidate may be correlated through perceived candidate intelligence. Under the section
Morality, Intelligence, and Pride, these experiments do find a positive correlation between
perceived high intelligence, perceived high morality, and feelings of pride in that candidate.
However, this positive correlation is not causal, and does not contribute to increased voter
participation in the intelligence experiment. Ultimately, the internal and external validities of this
experiment are mitigated by the difficulty of making a fictitious candidate appear unintelligent
on an advertisement.
Morality, Intelligence, and Pride
This final section tests the correlation between morality, intelligence and pride.
Hypothesis 3 states Among 18-24 year olds, candidates who are perceived as highly intelligent
or highly moral are more likely to be a candidate to take pride in than candidates who are not
perceived as highly intelligent or moral. In the ANES data, a strong correlation between taking
pride in a candidate and youth voter turnout was found (www.electionstudies.org 2010).
However, as discussed, operationalizing a candidate who young people take pride in is difficult.
It is difficult to isolate a variable that can represent pride alone without other confounding
variables. Ultimately, in an experimental setting, the internal validity of operationalizing
variables is difficult to maintain for independent variables like “pride.”
However, analyzing whether the candidates who were perceived as highly moral and
highly intelligence were also perceived as a candidate to take pride in will contribute to the
literature. If there is a strong correlation between morality and pride and intelligence and pride,
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then this experiment finds consistent correlations as found in the ANES data. While these
correlations cannot draw a causal relationship between pride and youth voter turnout, they
illustrate the need for future study of the independent variable “candidate pride.”
Morality and Pride
Treatment

Mean Response
(7-point scale)

Control Group

3.9263

Pos. Moral Cue
Neg. Moral Cue

4.2683
2.7143

Treatment
Effect
0.3420
-1.2120

Standard Error

P-value

95% Confidence
Interval

0.1209

0.000

[3.6882

4.1644]

0.1777
0.1644

0.055

[-0.0078
[-1.5357

0.6917]
-0.8883]

0.000

The question testing this correlation in the study read, “On a scale of 1 to 7, how strongly
do you agree with the following statement: ‘Brian Walsh demonstrates a strong moral
character.’” The 7-point response scale ranged from ‘1- Strongly disagree’ to ‘7- Strongly agree.’
The treatment group that received the control flyer neither agreed or disagreed with the pride
question. This is to be expected as no personality cue was given. The positive treatment cue
resulted in a 0.3420 increase in feelings of pride towards Brian Walsh. This was statistically
significant with a low p-value of 0.055. The candidate flyer that was perceived as immoral was
also a candidate that individuals did not take pride in. This is an interesting result because while
it was anticipated (based on the ANES data) that particularly high feelings of pride would be
correlated with an increased commitment to vote, it was not anticipated that particularly low
feelings of pride would be correlated with low perceptions of morality.
In summation, evidence for hypothesis 3 Among 18-24 year olds, candidates who are
perceived as highly intelligent or highly moral are more likely to be a candidate to take pride in
than candidates who are not perceived as highly intelligent or moral is found in Experiment 1,
looking at the morality treatment effects. This reproduces the correlation observed in the ANES
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cumulative data file. The next section discusses the correlation between intelligence and pride
based on the second part of hypothesis 3.
Intelligence and Pride
Treatment

Mean
Response (7point scale)
Control Group
4.1
Pos. Intelligence Cue 4.6275
Neg. Intelligence Cue 4.3977

Treatment
Effect

Standard
Error

P-value

95% Confidence
Interval

0.1104
0.1553
0.1614

0.000

0.5275
0.2977

[3.6882
[0.2216
[-0.0200

0.001
0.066

4.1644]
0.8332]
0.6153]

Overall, individuals given the Tipson control flyer felt slightly more pride towards the
candidate than individuals given the Walsh control flyer. The positive intelligence cue resulted
in a higher feeling of pride in the experiment by 0.5275 points. This is to be expected as
intelligent politicians are generally respected among the electorate. The negative intelligence cue
also resulted in a higher level of pride compared to the control group. This provides some insight
into the possible interpretation of the negative intelligence cue that was not internalized as
intended. Since we know the negative intelligence cue resulted in higher feelings of pride than
the control, we can interpret that the negative intelligence candidate was internalized as a
positive candidate in some respect. This provides some support for the theory that the candidate
was internalized as a political outsider who isn’t entrenched in the establishment.
Ultimately, the positive intelligence cue resulted in a stronger change in feelings of pride
than the negative intelligence cue. Thus, evidence in support of hypothesis 3 Among 18-24 year
olds, candidates who are perceived as highly intelligent or highly moral are more likely to be a
candidate to take pride in than candidates who are not perceived as highly intelligent or moral is
found. This correlation supports the correlations between pride and voter turnout in the ANES
data. Future research is needed to draw a causal link between taking pride in a candidate and
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political participation among youths. This experimental design did not allow for the internal
validity necessary to test perceived candidate pride.
Conclusion
Voter turnout among youths has been in steady decline since the 1960s in American
presidential elections. This trend poses a paradox for cost-benefit analysis theories in the existing
literature. The cost-benefit theories posit that fewer barriers to voting—such as higher education
and an increased access to information—should result in greater voter turnout, which has not
been observed (Brody 1978). Within this broader decline, there is marked fluctuation in turnout
from election to election among youths. Older cohorts, on the other hand, vote at more consistent
rates over time. This poses a second problem for the existing literature: “What factors could be
changing from election to election that only affect young voters?” Emotionality, candidate traits,
and other behavioral factors have been identified as possible independent variables in the
literature, and this study builds on those theories to test candidate traits as causes of youth voter
turnout. This study utilizes those theories along with the positive correlations in the American
National Election Survey cumulative data file to identify candidate “morality” and
“knowledgeability/ intelligence,” as well as “taking pride in a candidate” as potential
independent variables affecting youth voter turnout. The ANES is valuable for its large,
nationwide, and representative sample which fortifies its external validity. However, the ANES
cannot draw causal relationships between candidate traits and youth voter turnout because of its
nonexperimental nature.
The online experiment conducted in this study, involving 295 18-24 years olds, tested for
evidence of a causal link between candidate morality and candidate intelligence with youth
political participation across multiple dependent variables; they included: voting, encouraging
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peers to vote, donating, and canvassing. This study provided the internal validity and
experimental setting that the ANES does not have. However, this experiment does not afford the
same external validity granted by the comprehensive capacity of the ANES cumulative file. This
study also looked at the correlation between “taking pride in a candidate” and “candidate
morality,” as well as the correlation between “taking pride in a candidate” and “candidate
intelligence.” The research aimed to test if the correlations found in the ANES were reproduced
in this study. Future research is needed to draw a causal link between taking pride in a candidate
and voter turnout among youths. This study focused only on the correlation between candidate
pride, intelligence and morality.
This paper contributes five major findings to the literature. First, among 18-24 year olds,
evidence is found that political participation is higher when a candidate appears highly moral or
immoral than when no information about morality is internalized. This relationship is strongest
for a negative (immoral) cue. Second, among 18-24 year olds, when participants were treated
with a highly intelligent candidate flyer, they were more likely to vote and engage in political
participation than when no information about intelligence was given. Further study is needed to
identify the effect of a candidate with low intelligence on voter turnout, as that cue was not
internalized in this study. Third, among the four types of political participation studied in these
experiments, the treatments had a greater effect on the low-cost forms of participation (voting
and encouraging peers to vote) than the high cost forms of participation (donating and
canvassing). Fourth, race and age both act as moderating variables on the effect that a morality
cue has on youth voter turnout. For the intelligence experiment, however, only evidence that age
moderated political participation was found; no evidence that race moderated the effect of the
intelligence cues on political participation surfaced. Fifth, the positive correlation between
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finding a candidate highly moral and taking pride in that candidate is observed. This positive
correlation with pride also holds true for candidates with high intelligence. These data reproduce
and add to the correlations observed in the ANES between “feeling pride in a candidate” and
increased voter turnout.
Understanding youth voter turnout is incredibly important for the landscape of American
politics. Without a vote, young people relinquish their voices to elites, older cohorts, and special
interests (Teixera 1984, 4). Democracy functions best when citizens of all demographics exercise
their civic rights. Furthermore, understanding the causes of young peoples’ voting behavior may
serve a prescriptive purpose. Identifying the factors that encourage youths to vote can help
candidates utilize these factors to engage newly enfranchised citizens. This paper contributes to
the literature towards achieving these ends. However, determining the factors affecting youth
turnout requires ongoing study as the political and social climate in America continue to change.
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